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The end of the Cold War left Cuba without a superpower ally.  It lost military 
protection and the majority of its trading partners.  As the isolated Cuban economy 
faltered many predicted an end to the Castro government.  Cuba entered a “Special 
Period” plagued with massive shortages of basic goods like fuel, food, and medicine.  
Cuba’s only hope for survival seemed to be to normalize relations with the United States 
so as to end the embargo.  This meant that Cuba would have to acquiesce to U.S. 
demands for an internal political change to democracy and an economic change to free 
market capitalism.  Instead, Cuba refused to ally with the United States and held firm to 
its socialist ideology.   
Although Cuba was steadfast in its ideology, it was forced to change its foreign 
policy tactics in order to survive in the new world order.  The end of Soviet economic 
subsidies and military protection made it no longer safe to send Cuban soldiers abroad.  
To continue with its strategy of military aid to states and revolutionary movements 
guaranteed Cuba’s global isolation and eventual collapse.  Cuba turned to non-military 
engagement as its tool of choice to promote its national interests, strengthen diplomatic 
relations, and increase trading partners.  Chief among its humanitarian tactics is medical 
diplomacy.   
The effects of humanitarian aid are examined using Cuba as a case study.  The 
scope consists of the entire history of Cuban foreign policy since the Cuban Revolution.  
The emphasis is on the shift from military to humanitarian aid that occurred with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  The purpose of examining the variety of countries that 
Cuba engaged with humanitarian aid is to identify conditional generalizations about the 
effectiveness of humanitarian aid, especially medical diplomacy.  These conditional 
generalizations provide a basis for recommending U.S. medical diplomacy policy options 
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The end of the Cold War left Cuba without a superpower ally.  It lost military 
protection and the majority of its trading partners.  As the isolated Cuban economy 
faltered many predicted an end to the Castro government.  Cuba entered a “Special 
Period” plagued with massive shortages of basic goods like fuel, food, and medicine.  
Cuba’s only hope for survival seemed to be to normalize relations with the United States 
so as to end the embargo.  This meant that Cuba would have to acquiesce to U.S. 
demands for an internal political change to democracy and an economic change to free 
market capitalism.  Instead, Cuba refused to ally with the U.S. and held firm to its 
socialist ideology.   
Although Cuba was steadfast in its ideology, it was forced to change its strategy 
to adapt and survive in the new world order.  The end of Soviet economic subsidies and 
military protection made it no longer safe to send Cuban soldiers abroad.  To continue 
with its strategy of military aid to states and revolutionary movements would guarantee 
Cuba’s global isolation and eventual collapse.  Instead, Cuba turned to political, 
economic, and humanitarian engagement as its tools of choice to promote its national 
interests, strengthen diplomatic relations, and increase its trading partners.  Chief among 
its humanitarian engagement tactics is medical diplomacy.   
Cuba’s success in surviving the fall of the Soviet Union and shift to a foreign 
policy emphasizing humanitarian aid and medical diplomacy raises a question: what is 
the effectiveness of a humanitarian strategy focused on medical diplomacy?  And can 
such a strategy be useful to the United States in its global War Against Terrorism?   
This thesis will examine Cuba’s use of foreign policy tools since the Revolution 
in 1959.  It will explain the shift from military to non-military foreign policy tactics and 
focus on the use of humanitarian aid, especially medical diplomacy.  Conventional 
wisdom on humanitarian aid is that while it is an effective means of strengthening an 
existing alliance, it is not effective in establishing a new alliance.  This belief is rooted in 
the political philosophy of Realism that values military strength and the pursuit of 
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national security objectives.  States base their alignments on fundamental interests, which 
might not be changed by aid.  Stephen Walt’s theory on aid in alliance formation captures 
this conventional viewpoint by advocating that aid may only be effective in very rare 
circumstances.   
An analysis of Cuban medical diplomacy will show that medical diplomacy can in 
fact satisfy all of Walt’s rare circumstances.  Effective employment of medical diplomacy 
can make it “punch above its weight” to further foreign policy goals.  Medical diplomacy 
is superior to humanitarian cooperation in education, sports, or culture.  While these areas 
are relatively positive, medical diplomacy can provide the invaluable gift of health to 
thousands of foreign people.  This in turn can pave the way for improved political and 
economic relations with Cuba.   
Each component of medical diplomacy will be effective in its own unique way.  
The export of doctors and medical school scholarships are especially critical to the 
effective employment of medical diplomacy. The export of doctors immediately and 
directly influences thousands through the patients that they individually treat.  Awarding 
medical school scholarships directly influences future members of the upper class and 
indirectly influences the thousands of patients they will eventually treat.  In this way 
Cuba can use medical diplomacy to punch above its weight by using a few people to 
influence thousands.  Importing patients for treatment in Cuba may be of value as a high 
visibility public relations tool, but can only directly influence a small number of patients 
due to high transportation costs.  Biotechnology assistance will be attractive to 
governments wishing to improve their domestic pharmaceutical production capability and 
professional exchanges are a common and uncontroversial means of sharing health 
information.   Both will have a limited impact on influencing the recipient’s population 
due to the low level of personal interaction.   
Cuba has used medical diplomacy towards Mexico, Iran, South Africa, 
Venezuela, the United States, and Honduras.  Each case study is unique and shows 
different effects of medical diplomacy.  Listed in ascending order according to medical 
diplomacy’s effectiveness they are: Mexico, Iran, South Africa, Venezuela, the United 
States, and Honduras.  Cuban medical diplomacy was the least effective with Mexico.  
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Mexico’s public health system is not in need of, nor open to, Cuban medical aid.  As a 
result, Cuban medical diplomacy has been limited to mainly professional exchanges.  
These exchanges have had negligible effect on reducing political tensions caused by the 
ideological differences of President Vicente Fox and Castro.  Instead, Mexican business 
interests are the main pacifying force.   
The next four cases are examples, to varying degrees, of aid cementing already 
existing alliances – a finding consistent with Walt’s views on aid.  In Iran, humanitarian 
engagement only served to enhance an already close political relationship with Cuba but 
failed to produce any significant trade agreements.  Iran-Cuba cooperation agreements 
are many but shallow.  It took the terrible economic conditions of the Cuban Special 
Period to act as the catalyst for increased trade.  The medical diplomacy component of 
biotechnology assistance was used, not as a political tool, but simply as an economic 
commodity to barter for Iranian oil.  In South Africa, Cuban medical diplomacy was well 
received by an ideologically sympathetic government in power coping with extreme 
health deficiencies.  Engagement created the potential for future trade agreements with 
Cuba and most importantly solidified South African political support for Cuba within the 
UN Human Rights Commission.  Venezuela is a similar case in which an ideologically 
sympathetic government  (that of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez) led the way for 
improved relations with Cuba.  Cuban medical diplomacy served to legitimate a 
favorable Venezuelan cooperative agreement that gained Cuba much needed oil.  Cuba 
also enjoys Venezuelan political support within the UN Human Rights Commission.  
Resulting cooperative agreements enabled Cuba to transform symbolic capital (socialist 
humanitarian aid) into economic capital (oil).  In the United States, Cuban medical 
diplomacy was effective at strengthening Cuba’s relationship to a friendly faction within 
the Congress and symbolically attacking U.S. policy towards Cuba.  Castro allocated 
hundreds of medical scholarships to the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) for their 
poor minority constituents.  The result is the continuation of CBC lobbying efforts for 
pro-Cuban legislation.   
Finally, the last case study challenges Walt by demonstrating medical 
diplomacy’s effectiveness in gaining new allies.  In Honduras, Cuban doctors helped with 
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the country’s recovery from the natural disaster of Hurricane Mitch.  These doctors 
generated strong domestic political support from the people they assisted, which helped 
overcome opposition to Cuban-Honduran cooperative agreements.  This led to the re-
establishment of full diplomatic relations with Cuba that had been severed in 1961. 
The case studies reveal conditional generalizations to Walt’s theory that are 
specific to medical diplomacy.  Whereas Walt’s theory is largely effective for evaluating 
medical diplomacy, it has two minor shortcomings and one major deficiency.  The 
following conditional generalizations for medical diplomacy will account for these 
deficiencies and complement Walt’s theory.   
Minor shortcoming: Medical diplomacy does not conform to the Realist perspective 
Medical diplomacy seeks not to alter national security objectives, but to use its inherent 
goodness to change attitudes.  
Medical diplomacy is an attempt to change a recipient’s feelings towards (hearts) 
and images of (minds) the donor.  This use of aid is different than Walt’s.  He advocates 
the Realist perspective that economic carrots will rarely override a state’s basic security 
needs.  Medical diplomacy’s, however, is inherently good and its benign nature can have 
an emotionally powerful effect on people.  This makes medical diplomacy potentially 
capable of satisfying all of Walt’s rare conditions under which aid is effective in 
establishing alliances.  This is most evident in the case study of Honduras, and to lesser 
degrees the United States, Venezuela, and South Africa. 
Minor shortcoming: Backlash not from ideology, but from domestic labor interests 
Medical diplomacy’s ability to export doctors can generate a hostile backlash from 
domestic medical professional organizations that fear competition and a loss of 
regulating power. 
In every case study that included the export of doctors (Honduras, Venezuela, 
South Africa) there was a hostile backlash.  This backlash was not generated by a 
difference of political views (ideology) that Walt’s theory emphasizes.  Instead it came 
from labor (medical professionals) that felt threatened by the introduction of cheap Cuban 
workers.    
Major deficiency: Democracy’s effect on target selection for penetration 
Medical diplomacy can promote alignment through penetration of the masses.  This is 
especially true in democratic states due to the influence of voters on elected officials.  
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Walt does not differentiate between different types of governments of recipient 
states and focuses on the impact of elite perceptions on alignment.  While this might be 
appropriate for non-democratic states, it is not altogether true for democratic states.  Elite 
perceptions are important, but the perception of the voting masses is also important.  
Walt’s lack of attention to the power of penetrating the voting masses of a democracy 
leads him to underestimate the potential power of medical diplomacy.  Medical 
diplomacy, especially the export of doctors and medical scholarships, has the potential to 
positively influence significant portions of the voting masses in a recipient country.  
These grateful voters can then in turn influence government elites to craft a favorable 
relationship with Cuba.  This is most clearly depicted in the Honduras case study.  
Grateful Hondurans protested the departure of Cuban doctors and efforts of the Honduran 
Medical Association to block a Honduras-Cuba medical cooperation agreement.  Cuban 
aid to the CBC is a reverse example.  Cuba directly influences the CBC with medical 
scholarships and then the CBC promotes a positive image of Cuba to their constituents.  
The case studies of Venezuela and South Africa illustrate a positive impact on a segment 
of the voting population, yet this segment has not demonstrated a political voice.  This 
could be because there is no danger of the Cuban doctors departing, thus removing the 
reason to protest.  To a lesser degree, medical diplomacy could potentially also promote 
alignment in non-democratic states through influencing the masses.  Although the masses 
do not have a vote, it is still in the interests of the governing elites to garner popular 
support in order to consolidate their power.  
Based on these findings, the thesis argues that medical diplomacy should 
complement U.S. military action in its War Against Terrorism by “winning the hearts and 
minds” of the world’s population in order to deny the terrorists sanctuary and recruits.  
The export of doctors and awarding of medical scholarships are especially effective 
components of medical diplomacy.  They can have an extremely positive influence on a 
population and serve to gain political support for the donor state.  A medical diplomacy 
package should aim to positively influence as many people as possible and foster the 
eventual self-sufficiency of the recipient state.  Specific policy options are listed below in 
order of potential effectiveness, starting with the most effective.   
 xx 
· Export of doctors : Small medical teams of a doctor, nurse, and technician 
sent on two-year tours to recipient states can positively influence 
thousands through the patients that they treat.   
· Medical scholarships : Scholarships for doctors, nurses, paramedics, and 
technicians serve to create the human resources necessary for public health 
care self-sufficiency.  They also positively influence the students through 
their time in the United States and interaction with Americans. 
· Basic infrastructure : Small medical clinics with refrigeration units for 
vaccines are cheap and effective ways to drastically improve public health.  
Additional projects could be focused on public sanitation (clean water and 
sewage treatment).  
· Import of patients : This is an expensive and potentially high profile 
means of treating patients with complex ailments in U.S. hospitals.  
Children should be the first recipients for both moral and public relations 
reasons.   
· Biotechnology: The focus should be on selling, subsidizing, or donating 
basic vaccines and inoculations.  These products are an inexpensive way 
to drastically improve public health. 
· Professional exchanges: Medical personnel from the recipient country 
can visit the United States to receive training and instruction from their 
counterparts in areas ranging from hospital administration to surgical 
procedures.  This could create solid bonds and good relations between 
health professionals in both countries. 
Medical diplomacy could play a vital role in the U.S. War Against Terrorism by 
garnering public support in recipient countries and thereby limiting potential terrorist 
sanctuaries and recruits.  The small and state of Cuba has used medical diplomacy with 
success in Honduras to gain a new ally and towards the U.S. Congressional Black 
Caucus, Venezuela, South Africa, and Iran to strengthen existing alliances.  A U.S. 
government civilian organization tasked with implementing medical diplomacy could 
demonstrate U.S. civilian control of the military, maintain and enhance unity of 
command over humanitarian efforts, build a positive U.S. image for the recipient 
population, reduce NGO criticism concerning military wearing civilian clothing while 





The end of the Cold War left Cuba without a superpower ally.  It lost military 
protection and the majority of its trading partners.  As the isolated Cuban economy 
faltered, many predicted an end to the Castro government.  Cuba entered a “Special 
Period” plagued with massive shortages of basic goods like fuel, food, and medicine.  
Cuba’s only hope for survival seemed to be to normalize relations with the United States 
so as to end the embargo.  This meant that Cuba would have to acquiesce to U.S. 
demands for an internal political change to democracy and an economic change to free 
market capitalism.  Instead, Cuba refused to ally with the U.S. and held firm to its 
socialist ideology.   
Although Cuba was steadfast in its ideology, it was forced to change its strategy 
to adapt and survive in the new world order.  The end of Soviet economic subsidies and 
military protection made it no longer safe to send Cuban soldiers abroad.  To continue 
with its strategy of military aid to states and revolutionary movements would guarantee 
Cuba’s global isolation and eventual collapse.  Instead, Cuba turned to political, 
economic, and humanitarian engagement as its tools of choice to promote its national 
interests, strengthen diplomatic relations, and increase its trading partners.  Chief among 
its humanitarian engagement tactics is medical diplomacy.   
Cuba’s success in surviving the fall of the Soviet Union and shift to a foreign 
policy emphasizing humanitarian aid and medical diplomacy raises a question: what is 
the effectiveness of a humanitarian strategy focused on medical diplomacy?  And can 
such a strategy be useful to the United States in its global War Against Terrorism?   
This thesis will examine Cuba’s use of foreign policy tools since the Revolution 
in 1959.  It will explain the shift from military to non-military foreign policy tactics and 
focus on the use of humanitarian aid, especially medical diplomacy.  Conventional 
wisdom on humanitarian aid is that while it is an effective means of strengthening an 
existing alliance, it is not effective in establishing a new alliance.  This belief is rooted in 
the political philosophy of Realism that values military strength and the pursuit of 
national security objectives.  States base their alignments on fundamental interests, which 
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might not be changed by aid.  Stephen Walt’s theory on aid in alliance formation captures 
this conventional viewpoint by advocating that aid may only be effective in very rare 
circumstances.   
An analysis of Cuban medical diplomacy will show that medical diplomacy can in 
fact satisfy all of Walt’s rare circumstances.  The analysis is based on case studies of 
Cuban medical diplomacy to Mexico, Iran, South Africa, Venezuela, the United States, 
and Honduras.  In addition, the case studies reveal conditional generalizations to Walt’s 
theory that are specific to medical diplomacy.  Medical diplomacy is an effective “soft 
power” tool.  Soft power refers to the use of resources to influence attitudes rather than 
military balance of power.  Medical diplomacy is inherently good and possesses unique 
characteristics that enable it to influence thousands.  Its benign nature can have an 
emotionally powerful effect on people making medical diplomacy capable of not only 
strengthen existing alliances, but creating new alliances as well. 
Based on these findings, the thesis argues that medical diplomacy should 
complement U.S. military action in its War Against Terrorism by “winning the hearts and 
minds” of the world’s population in order to deny the terrorists sanctuary and recruits.  
The export of doctors and awarding of medical scholarships are especially effective 
components of medical diplomacy.  They can have an extremely positive influence on a 
population and serve to gain political support for the donor state. 
Chapter II examines the post-Cold War shift in Cuban foreign policy.  First, the 
general foreign policy goals developed by the Cuban revolutionary government in order 
to survive in the face of U.S. opposition are discussed.  Next, Cuba’s use of military aid 
to serve its foreign policy goals during most of the Cold War is examined.  It failed to 
achieve much success with the promotion of guerrilla insurgencies in the 1960s but had 
more success in using its newly professionalized military to provide conventional support 
in African civil wars in the 1970s and 1980s.  Finally, Cuba’s shift in foreign policy 
tactics at the end of the Cold War is explained.  The termination of Soviet economic and 
military sponsorship and increased U.S. pressure on recipients of Cuban military aid led 
the Cuban government to abandon its use of military aid by 1991.  Instead, it relied more 
heavily on humanitarian aid to gain political allies and trading partners -- an approach 
3 
which was more feasible for Cuba given its limited resources and which enabled Cuba to 
avoid international criticism.   
Chapter III evaluates Cuba’s foreign policy shift and the potential effectiveness of 
medical diplomacy.  First, Cuba’s development of its medical power is described.  Cuba’s 
complex health infrastructure, abundance of health professionals, and First World health 
statistics give Cuban medical diplomacy domestic legitimacy and international 
credibility.  Next each of the five components of Cuban medical diplomacy are 
examined.  These include the export of doctors, awarding of medical scholarships, import 
of patients, biotechnology assistance, and professional exchanges.  Finally, some 
hypotheses are advanced about the potential effectiveness of medical diplomacy.  
Political Scientist Stephen Walt argues that aid can only be effective in gaining allies 
under rare circumstances.  Medical diplomacy, however, is a unique form of aid.  Its 
inherent goodness is psychologically appealing and can potentially alter people’s 
perceptions to favor alignment.  Examination of Walt’s theory shows that medical 
diplomacy could satisfy all of the criteria to be one of these rare circumstances. 
Chapter IV determines the effectiveness of Cuban medical diplomacy in practice.  
First, the case studies of Cuban medical diplomacy to Mexico, Iran, South Africa, 
Venezuela, the United States, and Honduras are introduced and Walt’s expectations about 
the effectiveness of medical diplomacy in general are revisited.  Next, each individual 
case study is used to evaluate the effectiveness of Cuba’s use of medical diplomacy in the 
Post-Cold War.  Finally, conditional generalizations will be formed based on a 
comparison of Walt’s expectations and the actual results of Cuban medical diplomacy 
Chapter V concludes by considering the application of these findings on medical 
diplomacy for the overall U.S. campaign strategy in its War Against Terrorism.  Specific 
medical diplomacy policies will be recommended to gain domestic and foreign support 
for the United States in its War Against Terrorism.  Public support, in turn, can deny 
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II. THE POST-COLD WAR SHIFT IN CUBAN FOREIGN 
POLICY 
Since the Revolution, Cuba’s foreign policy goals have remained the same but the 
tactics used to implement them have changed.  The two enduring strategic goals have 
been the protection of the government from external attack and the gaining of resources 
to support development.  The military was used throughout the Cold War as the main 
foreign policy tool to increase the number of friendly socialist governments.  With the 
end of the Cold War, however, the termination of Soviet aid and increased pressure from 
the U.S. led the Cuban government to abandon its use of the military abroad.  Instead, it 
chose to emphasize non-military engagement.  Chief among its humanitarian aid tactics is 
medical diplomacy.   
The first section of this chapter describes the general foreign policy goals 
developed by the Cuban revolutionary government in order to survive in the face of U.S. 
opposition.  The second section shows how Cuba used military aid in the service of its 
foreign policy goals during most of the Cold War.  It failed to achieve much success with 
the promotion of guerrilla insurgencies in the 1960s but had more success in using its 
newly professionalized military to provide conventional support in African civil wars in 
the 1970s and 1980s.  Finally, the third section explains the shift in Cuban foreign policy 
tactics with the end of the Cold War.  The termination of Soviet economic and military 
sponsorship and increased U.S. pressure on recipients of Cuban military aid led the 
Cuban government to abandon its use of military aid by 1991.  Instead, it relied more 
heavily on non-military engagement to gain political allies and trading partners -- an 
approach which was more feasible for Cuba given its limited resources and which 
enabled Cuba to avoid international criticism.   
A. CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY: WHY AN ACTIVIST FOREIGN POLICY?  
Cuban foreign policy developed to guard the small island nation’s sovereignty 
and also to make deals with powerful allies to gain vital resources to overcome its 
underdeve lopment and foster growth.  Revolutionary Cuba faced enemies (Cuban 
Americans) backed by the United States and had limited resources with which to defend 
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itself.  It formulated an activist foreign policy with the strategic goals of: (1) defending 
the socialist government, and (2) gaining resources to sustain itself.  This policy aimed to 
export and encourage socialist revolution throughout the Third World in order to gain 
political and economic allies.  Cuba would balance this counter-dependency policy with a 
superpower-client relationship with the Soviet Union.  This relationship was critical to 
gaining Cuba the material resources it needed to develop and military protection from the 
United States. 
The situation for Revolutionary Cuba looked bleak.  On 1 January 1959 Fidel 
Castro and his group of guerrilla soldiers had seized control of the government promising 
social justice.  Thousands of wealthy Cubans began to peacefully emigrate.  Most of them 
saw the sweeping socialist changes as a threat to their personal fortunes.  These Cubans 
were welcomed by the United States which was engaged in a global ideological war 
against communism and saw Castro’s government as a threat.  In 1960 the CIA began to 
train an army of Cuban expatriates for the invasion of Cuba and restoration of the 
friendly yet corrupt Batista regime (Dominguez, 1989, p. 24).   
The infant revolutionary government had made many promises of social justice 
yet had little resources to use.  These promises had begun with the Sierra Maestra 
guerrillas battling against the Batista regime in late 1950s.  They shared their modest 
field hospitals with the farmers of the region, most of whom had never seen a doctor.  
They also promised that once the revolution triumphed, decent medical and social 
services would be available for all (Global News Wire, 30 Mar 2001a).  The new 
government needed to show that it could deliver on its promises.  Cuba was still largely 
underdeveloped and in need of material, capital, and human resources.  The exodus of 
wealthy Cubans had made the situation worse.  Capital flight was rampant.  Intellectuals, 
professionals, and many middle class Cubans left in a “brain drain” of human capital.  
Half of Cuba’s 6000 doctors left the country.     
The new Cuban government became more isola ted and in need of allies as time 
went by.  Trade relations with the United States began to deteriorate and then collapsed 
with the Bay of Pigs invasion on 17 April 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 
1962 (Dominguez, 1989, p. 1).  The United States led the other western hemispheric 
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countries in ousting Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in February 
1962 (Erisman, p. 64).  The government saw Cuba’s sovereignty in jeopardy from U.S. 
economic and military power.  
An overarching and critical goal of the Castro- led revolutionary government was 
the protection of Cuban sovereignty.  This meant that the Cuban government would not 
be in a position that allowed it to be pressured by foreign influences.  These foreign 
influences included the governments of other nations or their private companies.  
Cuban sovereignty and foreign policy were not independent in the past.  Cubans 
viewed the sovereignty of pre-revolutionary Cuba as questionable at best and its foreign 
policy as a forcibly imposed mirror image of U.S. policy.  “Cuban ‘foreign policy’, like 
that of almost all Latin American counties of those years (pre-revolutionary period), was 
nonexistent since, in reality, it was an exact reflection of that of the United States, whose 
diplomats sent precise instructions to Cuban representatives regarding its orientation” 
(Jorge).   
The two strategic goals that would ensure Cuban sovereignty were (1) the 
protection of the socialist government and (2) the gaining of resources to develop and 
sustain its socialist economy.  The first required political and military allies to support 
Cuba’s government against the perceived threat from the U.S.  The second strategic goal 
also required allies.  These allies were needed to donate, subsidize, trade, or loan material 
resources and assist with training programs to make Cuba more self-sufficient.   
Cuba crafted an activist foreign policy to achieve its strategic goals of protecting 
the government and gaining resources.  This policy centered on the export and 
encouragement of socialist revolution throughout the Third World.  The government 
hoped to gain many allies and overwhelm the U.S. through sending Cuban soldiers, 
doctors, teachers, and technicians to Third World states around the globe.  This 
counterdependency strategy aimed to make Cuba less dependent on any one country by 
developing relations with many countries.  Once this was achieved Cuba could organize 
and lead the other Third World states in collective bargaining with the Developed World.   
The economic development of other Third World countries was in Cuba’s 
interest.  A developed Third World ally would be capable of aiding Cuba with increased 
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trade and political support against the policies of the United States at some time in the 
future.  This meant that Cuban aid to other developing countries and national liberation 
movements would consist of humanitarian as well as military assistance.  This was often 
done for free or at bargain prices in the name of solidarity (friendship with Cuba).  The 
activist foreign policy was not effective in the short-run however.  The targeted states 
were underdeveloped and so unable to assist Cuba with gaining near term resources. 
To secure resources for its socialist economy, therefore, Cuba decided to ally with 
the Soviet Union.  This relationship is best characterized as a superpower-client 
relationship.  Havana received massive amounts of aid from the Soviets yet still retained 
a high degree of independence in its domestic and foreign affairs.  At certain times, 
however, Cuba curbed its aggressive policies under the threat of the sharp reduction in 
Soviet economic aid.  Throughout the Cold War the Cuban government would balance 
these two, sometimes conflicting, policies of counterdependency and superpower-client 
relationship.  By doing so Cuba’s socialist government would be protected and resources 
would be secured to perpetuate the socialist state.   
B. CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY IN PRACTICE DURING THE COLD WAR: 
MILITARY EMPHASIS 
Military force was the dominant foreign policy tool used by Cuba during the Cold 
War.  The government created vast pools of human resources as part of its overall 
socialist agenda.  The Cuban people benefited from a greatly improved education and 
public health system and were immersed in socialist ideology.  These human resources 
were harnessed by the Cuban government, which evolved the military from irregular 
guerrilla troops into a powerful and professional army.  The Cuban armed forces failed to 
achieve much success with guerrilla insurgencies in the 1960s but later won three 
conventional wars in Africa during the 1970s and 1980s.  Throughout the Cold War 
humanitarian aid served only to complement military aid.   
1. The Creation of Human Resources 
The Cuban government invested heavily in education and health care to assist and 
develop its human resources.  Prior to the Revolution, Cuba had an illiteracy rate of 
23.6% (Dominguez, 1989, p. 150) and only four universities.  After the Revolution the 
government embarked on a massive literacy campaign.  High school students were sent to 
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remote rural regions to teach fellow Cubans to read and write.  Confiscated mansions and 
country clubs were transformed into schools and universities.  Cuba reduced its illiteracy 
rate to 12.9% in 1970 and to 4% in 1981 and its forty universities increased graduates 
from 58,000 in 1953 to 288,000 in 1981 (Dominguez, 1989, p. 150).   
Cuban investment in health brought universal health care to every citizen.  The 
government established small medical clinics in every region of the country and staffed 
these clinics with a doctor, a nurse, and a technician.  The government also planned to 
place a doctor at every school and factory while still maintaining a force for overseas 
duty.  The Cuban public health system stressed preventive medicine and initiated public 
sanitation projects.  The many small medical clinics scheduled Cubans for regular 
checkups, inoculate children against diseases, and gave pregnant women special care.  
Cuban health statistics improved dramatically including the number of doctors per 
population, the infant mortality rate, and life expectancy.  Cuba’s investment in education 
and health resulted in a strong and highly educated population. 
Cuba supported its activist foreign policy with its revolutionary ideology and  
concept of the Hombre Nuevo or New Man.  Cuban ideology taught that the Cuban 
people were the vanguard, not only of their own revolution, but a global revolutionary 
cause.  The New Man would be selflessly devoted to the revolution and its ideals.  He 
would work hard for moral incentives and readily sacrifice for his nation.  He would be 
the instrument to carry out the building of a socialist paradise.  The government 
established extensive ideological training programs to facilitate the making of the New 
Man.  Those who dissented from the state’s teachings were ostracized or imprisoned for 
“dangerousness.”  Dangerousness meant to say or do anything that might destabilize the 
government.  The ideological training program created a radically devoted army of 
Cubans to carry out Castro’s building of a socialist state. 
2. The Cuban Military: Irregular Guerrilla Troops  
The origin of Cuba’s military was Fidel Castro’s 26th of July guerrilla movement.  
His forces operated in small groups in the rural areas to organize popular support.  Their 
weapons consisted mostly of small arms and whatever else they could get their hands on.  
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They were an unprofessionalized bunch of men and women who were dedicated to their 
revolutionary cause.   
Throughout the 1960s Cuba used its own model for armed revolution in 
supporting and exporting revolution abroad.  This was reflected in Castro’s famous 
phrase, “the duty of every revolutionary is to make revolution” (Erisman, p. 66).  The 
logic behind this strategy was to either create revo lutionary governments or to use Cuban 
support of revolutionary movements as leverage in dealing with established governments.  
If Cuba could not create a new ally through supporting revolution, it could cease its 
support in order to gain an alliance with the existing government.  Initially, military 
assistance was to be accomplished using the Cuban revolutionary model of training and 
inserting small guerrilla bands throughout the rural regions of Latin America.  This tactic 
failed, as one after another, the guerrilla offensives of the 1960s were smashed.   
The greatest failure was to the legendary Che Guevara’s Bolivian operation in 
1969.  Che led a small band of guerrillas into Bolivia to organize a revolution.  They 
failed and were eventually tracked down and killed by U.S.-backed Bolivian troops and 
the CIA in October 1967 (Erisman, p. 73).  Che became an icon and martyr of the Cuban 
revolutionary cause.  Cuba was also pressured by the Soviets to curb its zealous export of 
revolution to Third World states.  In 1968 “…angry over many Cuban domestic and 
foreign policies, the U.S.S.R. imposed sanctions on Cuba.  Cuba backed down, and the 
hegemonic relationship was subsequently rebuilt” (Dominguez, 1989, p. 4).  The Cuban 
guerrilla campaign was to be replaced with a more effective tactic.  
3. The Cuban Military: Powerful and Professional Army  
Failure of the Cuban guerrilla model for revolution caused this idea to be replaced 
by the concept of armed intervention with a modern professional army.  Membership in 
the Soviet- led Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) brought large infusions 
of military aid.  The Soviets equipped and trained the Cuban military and made it into a 
modern fighting force.  Guerrillas were replaced with brigades equipped with artillery, 
tanks, and modern fighter aircraft.  The entire force was professionalized and had the 
respect of the Cuban people.  “Moreover, Cuba received massive amounts of military aid 
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from the socialist bloc, which transformed its armed forces into a formidable organization 
that even the Pentagon was not anxious to confront” (Erisman, p. 80). 
Cuba could now intervene militarily on behalf of its allies using its new model of 
revolutionary support.  The Cuban military was involved in or supported military action 
in Algeria, Portuguese African colonies, Angola, Ethiopia, Grenada, and Nicaragua.  
Ethiopia and Angola included major deployments that tipped the scales in favor of 
Cuba’s allies.  Unlike the failures of the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union 
in Afghanistan, Cuba won the three wars it fought on African soil: Angola 1975-1976, 
Ethiopia 1977-78, and Angola 1987-88 (Dominguez, 1997).  The ability to send troops 
abroad powered Cuba’s ascent to the leadership of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM).  
NAM is a political organization of Third World countries not aligned with the United 
States or the Soviet Union that was created in 1955. 
4. Humanitarian Aid as a Complement to Military Aid 
Military aid was complemented by humanitarian aid in carrying out Cuba’s 
activist foreign policy during the Cold War.  Humanitarian aid consisted of sending 
doctors, teachers, and technicians abroad.  For the Castro regime this humanitarian aid 
had the same goal as military aid: to gain solidarity with other Third World states against 
the United States in a Cuban effort to defend itself.  Economic development of other 
Third World states would benefit Cuba by making these allies capable of economically 
aiding Cuba in the future.  Cuba also began to gain immediate economic rewards in 1978 
when it chose to charge market rates for humanitarian services to some oil-rich states.       
The growth of civilian aid programs increased dramatically beginning in the mid 
to late 1970s, so much so that Cuba had in 1985 what The New York Times called 
“perhaps the largest Peace Corps style program of civilian aid in the world,” with 
approximately sixteen thousand doctors, teachers, construction engineers, agronomists, 
economists, and other specialists serving in twenty-two Third World countries.  In fact, 
Cuba had more doctors working abroad then (fifteen hundred in twenty-five countries) 
than did the World Health Organization (Feinsilver, p. 172).  This growth was enabled by 
material resources from the Soviets and Cuba’s own highly developed human resources.  
It is accurate to describe Cuba’s educated and skilled labor force as its “product 
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specialization.”  The appendix summarizes the scope and location of Cuba’s main 
overseas civilian programs, not including trade in goods, in the late 1980s.  Despite the 
important contributions of humanitarian assistance projects, they were greatly 
overshadowed by Cuba’s military assistance programs. 
C. THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE SHIFT TO HUMANITARIAN 
TACTICS 
At the end of the Cold War Cuba chose to abandon its use of the military as a 
foreign policy tool and emphasize non-military engagement instead.  By 1991, Cuba 
repatriated its military forces from abroad and publicly announced the end of its military 
support for revolutions.  The reasons behind this shift were the end of Soviet economic 
and military aid, increased U.S. pressure, and the rise of globalization.  Cuba needed a 
new foreign policy tactic to fit its new situation.  The tactic had to gain political allies and 
trading partners, be immune to U.S. criticism, and be feasible given Cuba’s reduced 
resources.  Cuba responded with a massive campaign of political, economic, and 
humanitarian engagement.  Humanitarian aid, most specifically medical diplomacy, has 
been the most effective in certain cases.  Reliance on Cuban human capital has enabled it 
to continue medical diplomacy despite the material shortages that have occurred with the 
end of Soviet subsidies. 
1. Reasons for Cuba’s Foreign Policy Shift 
The end of the Cold War generated several powerful reasons for Cuba to alter its 
foreign policy.  As the Berlin Wall crumbled, so did Cuba’s special status with the Soviet 
Union.  Severe economic problems in the U.S.S.R. caused Cuba’s fat subsidies to quickly 
disappear.  The Cuban economy was devastated and by 1991 export and import levels 
had dropped to almost 50% of 1989 levels (March-Poquet, p. 92).  In 1990 Castro 
announced the commencement of a “Special Period in peacetime” (Snodgrass).  Social 
services remained but the entire country was plagued by scarcity.  “Schools remained 
open, but without paper or pencils (students shouted back lessons recited by the teacher).  
Health care remained free, but medicine and supplies were scarce: hospital patients had to 
bring their own sheets, towels, soap, and food” (Linderman, p. 32).   
In addition to economic aid Cuba was stripped of any sign of Soviet military 
protection as well.  The Soviets terminated subsidized arms sales to Cuba and unilaterally 
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withdrew their military presence from Cuban soil in 1991.  The United States increased 
pressure on Cuba and its military allies.  In 1991 the United States announced that no aid 
would go to any Latin American or African state that was a military ally to Cuba 
(Dominguez, 1997).  This policy carried serious repercussions for developing nations.  
With the Soviets gone, the United States held the majority of the world’s purse strings 
including influence over international financial institutions.   
The United States also attempted to speed the collapse of the Castro regime by 
tightening its embargo and pressuring other states to comply.  Title III (never 
implemented) of the U.S. Cuban Democracy Act (Helms-Burton) promised to sue any 
company in any country who did business with a Cuban company that used repatriated 
equipment seized “unlawfully” during the Revolution.   
The end of the Cold War gave rise to the era of globalization that emphasizes free 
markets and the privatization of industry.  Governments had to choose between engaging 
in the free world markets or being left behind in a state of underdevelopment.  A policy 
of self- isolation would condemn Cuba to certain poverty. 
2. Requirements of the New Strategy  
Cuba needed a foreign policy tactic to fit its new situation.  The tactic had to gain 
political allies and trading partners, be immune to U.S. criticism, and be feasible given 
Cuba’s resources.  Cuba’s loss of its most powerful ally and benefactor left it desperately 
needing many new allies.  It needed political support in refuting allegations of human 
rights abuses by the UN Human Rights Commission and resisting pressure to 
democratize its domestic politics.  It needed new trading partners to fill the huge void left 
from the demise of the Soviet Union.  Its new tactic had to escape U.S. criticism and not 
give the U.S. justification for increased pressure or military action against the island.  
Most importantly, the new tactic had to use what resources Cuba had.  Cuba’s material 
resources were in short supply.  What it did have was an educated population, a vast pool 
of highly technical human resources. 
3. Evidence of Cuba’s Foreign Policy Shift 
Evidence of Cuba’s foreign policy shift included its repatriation of its military 
forces abroad and public announcement that it would no longer support revolutionary 
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movements militarily, or provide military assistance to an ally.  Cuba began to repatriate 
its armed forces soon after the demise of the Soviet Union.  In September 1989 it 
repatriated troops from Ethiopia, in March 1990 all military personnel in Nicaragua 
returned home, and in May 1991 Cuba repatriated its last troops from Angola.  
Throughout 1990 and 1991 Cuba brought home other troops from a host of countries 
including a small mission that had been in Congo for fourteen years.  Thus, as the Cold 
War ended in Europe and Cuba lost the military and economic backing of the Soviet 
Union, Cuba’s overseas military presence came to a near- instantaneous end (Dominguez, 
1997). 
Cuba backed away from its military support of revolutionaries and then publicly 
announced the end of this policy.  This included Cuba’s military sponsorship of 
revolutionary movements such as the FMLN in El Salvador.  In June 1991 the Cuban 
Foreign Minister stated,  
Cuba does not renounce, nor will it ever renounce, nor has it any reason to 
hide or camouflage its strong bonds of brotherhood and solidarity [with 
the FMLN however]…in order to foster the climate of trust required for 
negotiations and as a clear signal of its political will to contribute to that 
process, Cuba has been limiting since [April 1991] its solidarity with the 
FMLN to the political level (Dominguez, 1997).   
Castro personally announced the complete turn-around of the military component 
of Cuba’s activist foreign policy in January 1992.  At a special commemoration of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis  he stated that Cuba would henceforth no longer support 
revolutionary movements militarily (Dominguez, 1997).  The world had become a much 
too dangerous and expensive place for Cuba to continue its military sponsorship of the 
FMLN or any other revolutionary group.  When the opportunity arose for Cuba to carry 
out its activist foreign policy using military assistance, it chose not to.  The re-eruption of 
civil war in Angola in the early 1990’s did not see the return of Cuban troops 
(Dominguez, 1997).  Cuba had officially ended the military component of its activist 
foreign policy. 
U.S. efforts to speed the collapse of the Castro regime by tightening its embargo 
backfired and actually assisted Cuba in gaining allies.  The Cuban Democracy Act 
15 
(Helms-Burton) received fierce criticism from America’s closest allies concerning Title 
III.  This resulted in a political backlash against the United States for its policy towards 
Cuba.   
Prior to the Cuban Democracy Act Castro’s regime had become internationally 
isolated.  It has since been able to construct a large and heterogeneous coalition to defend 
itself…In late 1992, for the first time since its began in 1960, the U.S. trade embargo was 
overwhelmingly condemned by the UN General Assembly, with the only U.S. support 
coming from Israel and Romania (Dominguez, 1997). 
The backfire of U.S. policy assisted the Cuban government as it began a strategic 
plan of engagement with countries throughout the world.  Engagement was an effort to 
gain political support against the United States and expand trade to secure desperately 
needed resources.  This included diplomatic, economic, and humanitarian cooperation 
measures.  Diplomatic efforts included a dramatic increase in high- level official visits 
and correspondence with foreign countries.  Economic measures included the drastic 
revision of Cuban foreign investment laws to attract capital.  Cuban humanitarian 
engagement consists of cooperation in the fields of medicine, culture, sports, and 
education (Dominguez, 1989, p. 1).  Of the forms of humanitarian engagement, Cuban 
medical diplomacy is the most dominant.  The Cuban definition of medical diplomacy is, 
“the collaboration between countries on health matters for the purpose of improving 
relations with one another…[medical diplomacy produces] humanitarian benefit while 
simultaneously developing improved relations” (Feinsilver, p. 156).  This type of 
diplomacy continues despite the material shortages of the Special Period. 
a. Cuban Medical Diplomacy Continues Despite the Special Period 
The government chose to deal with the Special Period initially with 
austerity measures and later on with tightly controlled economic reforms.  At all times it 
placed the highest priority on continuing to provide its renowned health and educational 
services.  Effective health care was a pillar of legitimacy that the government did not 
want to lose.  A public opinion poll in 1990 found that one-fifth believed the food supply 
to be good and only one-tenth believed the transportation system to be good.  These low 
numbers give credibility to the poll.  It also found that three-fourths thought the health 
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care system was good and four-fifths thought that the education system was good (Perez-
Lopez). 
Severely limited resources forced the government to make some 
concessions in public health care delivery.  Emphasis was placed on tasks that could be 
accomplished with human resources rather than material.  These included health 
promotion, disease prevention, and monitoring the public health.  Basically, clinical 
treatment was provided but hospital treatment was authorized only when strictly 
necessary (The Economist).   
The U.S. embargo had a significant impact on the flow of medicine and 
medical supplies into the country.  Cuba’s biotechnology industry could manufacture life 
saving vaccines but not the plethora of medicines its population needs.  The Helms-
Burton Act made it extremely difficult to obtain a license to sell medicine to Cuba.  From 
1992-1997 only 31 licenses were granted representing only $1.66 million worth of sales 
to Cuba.  Frustrated by the abundance of human resources yet massive material shortages 
Richard Alarcon, President of the National Assembly, said, “You cannot make an aspirin 
in a hospital if you have no aspirin.  No peoples’ initiative can change that” (French).   
When the Cold War ended and the Special Period began, many experts 
expected medical diplomacy to end.  One such expert was Julie Feinsilver, a specialist on 
Cuban health from Oberlin College.   
What is clear in 1991 is that large-scale medical missions like those sent to 
Angola [700 medical personnel] will be the exception rather than the rule.  
Medical missions will persist but on a smaller scale and probably at a 
higher level of specification (Feinsilver, p. 194).   
Although medical missions in recent years have been smaller than the 
record high 700 person Angolan mission, they continue to be a pillar of Cuban foreign 
policy.  Cuba has been able to do so because of its vast human health resources.   
After hurricanes ‘George’ and ‘Mitch’ slammed several Central American 
countries in 1998, Cuban authorities set up a health program that has since 
sent more than 2,500 Cuban doctors to 14 Latin American countries, the 
Caribbean, and Africa (Global News Wire, 15 Jan 2000).   
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Medical diplomacy has continued to be a good choice for Cuba because of 
its abundance of human health resources.   
It also makes good diplomatic sense to provide assistance, for minimum 
cost or gratuitous, particularly when a large pool of educated and skilled 
youth have been available to perform such duties (Feinsilver, p. 185).   
The Cuban government’s investment in medical education had provided it 
with an abundance of health professionals.  Chapter III describes the components of 
medical diplomacy and offers reasons, drawn from the work of Political Scientist Stephen 
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III. EVALUATING THE SHIFT: THE POTENTIAL 
EFFECTIVENESS OF MEDICAL DIPLOMACY 
The Cuban government has used its health resources so effectively in medical 
diplomacy missions to the Third World that “…health care as a form of political outreach 
has become one of the dominant narratives of the Cuban revolution” (Feinsilver, p. xiii). 
Medical diplomacy is a special form of humanitarian aid that Cuba employs to 
forward its foreign policy.  Cuba possesses a highly developed domestic public health 
care system that it can leverage for use in foreign policy.  This foreign policy of medical 
diplomacy includes the export of doctors, import of patients, medical school scholarships, 
biotechnology, and professional exchanges.  Conventional wisdom based on the Realist 
perspective holds that aid can only be effective in gaining allies under rare circumstances.  
Medical diplomacy, however, is a unique form of aid.  Its inherent goodness is 
psychologically appealing and can potentially alter people’s perceptions to favor 
alignment and thus satisfy these rare circumstances.    
The first section of this chapter describes Cuba’s development of the domestic 
resources that enable it to practice medical diplomacy.  Cuba’s complex health 
infrastructure, abundance of health professionals, and First World health statistics give 
Cuban medical diplomacy domestic legitimacy and international credibility.  The second 
section describes each of the five components of Cuban medical diplomacy.  Finally, the 
third section advances some hypotheses about the potential effectiveness of medical 
diplomacy.  Political Scientist Stephen Walt argues that aid can only be effective in 
gaining allies under rare circumstances.  Examination of his theory shows that medical 
diplomacy could satisfy all of the criteria to be one of these rare circumstances.  
A. CUBAN MEDICAL POWER: A PLENTIFUL RESOURCE 
Cuba possesses an advanced health care system that gives it the resources to 
employ medical diplomacy.  Construction of this system began as a promise of social 
justice by the Castro government to the Cuban people.  The government invested vast 
amounts of human and material capital to produce skilled medical personnel and a 
complex public health care infrastructure.  Universal medical care created domestic 
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support and gave the infant government domestic legitimacy.  Failure to produce tangible 
social services would have undermined and discredited the new regime.  “A socialist 
ideology places emphasis on moral over economic capital and chooses to sacrifice the 
present for the future.  At some point a socialist government must be able to transfer 
moral capital into economic capital.  In the long run, if it continues to rely on moral 
capital without producing any material benefits, the symbolism becomes empty and the 
regime’s promises absurd” (Feinsilver, p. xi).  In addition, Cuba’s medical diplomacy 
gained international credibility from its developed health infrastructure, abundance of 
health professionals, and achievement of First World health statistics.   
The Cuban government achieved results in developing its medical power by 
claiming its responsibility for health, allocating resources and attention to its 
development, and emphasizing preventive medicine.  Health is a foundational value in 
Cuban socialism.  As such, the government assumes complete responsibility for the 
health of every Cuban.  The Cuban Ministry of Public Health clearly states, “Health is the 
right of all citizens and is the responsibility of the government” (Hussnain).  This strong 
belief in the value of health drove the government’s development of the Cuban public 
health care system. 
The new socialist government was able to produce tangible health benefits by 
focusing its limited material and human resources on health.  “Cuba’s health care system 
has succeeded through the political commitment to allocate significant fiscal, physical, 
and human resources to this sector” (Feinsilver, p. 208).  It could have chosen to provide 
mediocre services across the entire spectrum of social services.  Instead it chose to focus 
on health and education and to accept less than ideal services in other sectors.  The 
government gained material resources from confiscating privately owned resources.  
Almost immediately the government began to nationalize major businesses including 
private hospitals, medical centers, and pharmaceutical companies.  Later on Cuba would 
get resources from the Soviet Union to continue development of the public health system. 
Human resources for the health sector were developed through the government’s 
massive education campaign.  Reducing illiteracy and guaranteeing a ninth grade 
education to all enabled the government to educate the population on basic health and 
21 
sanitation topics.  New medical schools developed the human capital necessary to drive 
the public health system.  The future of the public health system and the health of the 
nation would be ensured by state- funded education. 
Health receives such high attention from the government that it is joked that the 
real minister of health is Fidel Castro.  Castro is daily involved with the public health 
care system.  His interest and dedication illustrate the government’s dedication to health.  
Castro has said that, “the health of the individual is a symbol of the health of the ‘body 
politic’ “ (Feinsilver, p. 200). 
The government emphasizes preventive health practices, allocating material 
resources and work crews to bring basic public health essentials to even the most rural 
area.  This meant the construction of roads, electrical lines, hygiene facilities, and 
sanitation systems throughout the country.  These infrastructure improvements drastically 
aided the improvement in public health. 
The government’s implementation of the family doctor program helped Cuba 
achieve “levels of health care unknown to most poor countries and rarer still, does so in 
the countryside as in the cities” (The Economist).  This program allocated a medical 
clinic with a doctor, nurse, and technician for every city block in Havana or rural 
equivalent.  The emphasis of the family doctor program is on primary and preventive 
health care.  Specific responsibilities include administering immunizations, prenatal care, 
cancer screenings, and caring for people with chronic conditions (The Economist).  
Ailments that cannot be treated at the family doctor level are referred to regional 
hospitals. 
As a result of these programs, Cuba’s health statistics improved.  The preventive 
care and inoculation program was so effective that it eliminated mumps, polio, and 
German measles.  Children are inoculated against a dozen different diseases (The 
Economist).  This enormous success in the area of public health includes having a very 
low infant mortality rate (see Table 1).  First world health statistics give enormous 
domestic credibility to the Cuban government and enormous international credibility to 
recipients of Cuban medical diplomacy. 
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  1980 1997 
Canada  10    6 
United States  13    7 
Cuba   20    7 
Chile   32  11 
Venezuela  36  21 
Argentina  35  22 
Colombia   41  24 
Mexico  51  31 
Brazil   70  34 
Peru   80  40 
 
Table 1.   Infant Mortality Per 1,000 Live Births. (The Economist) 
 
Cuban doctors and other medical personnel became important tools and symbols 
of the Revolution.  Tens of thousands of Cubans were trained to work in the health sector 
as doctors, nurses, technicians, and researchers.  These people serve as a constant 
reminder of what the revolution has done for all.  These individuals have been given the 
name “human health monuments.”  “Human health monuments reinforce the values of 
the revolution through continued contact with the population.  Recognizing this Castro 
has even called the new family doctors ‘symbols of the revolution’” (Feinsilver, p. 202). 
B. COMPONENTS OF MEDICAL DIPLOMACY 
Cuban medical diplomacy has five components: export of doctors, import of 
patients, medical school scholarships, biotechnology, and professional exchanges.  The 
first is sending Cuban medical workers abroad.  Cuban medical brigades are comprised of 
doctors, nurses, and technicians who usually treat poor patients in rural areas with little 
indigenous medical care.  Second, the Cuban hospital system is used to treat foreign 
patients for a variety of complex operations.  Third, foreigners are given seven-year 
medical scholarships to study in Cuba in order to return to their own country to practice 
medicine.  Fourth, Cuba’s biotechnology industry is able to produce life-saving vaccines 
and medicines.  It exports not only these pharmaceutical products, but the technology to 
manufacture them as well.  Finally, professional exchanges of doctors and health 
administrators with other states stimulates professional medical cooperation.   
The first component of Cuban medical diplomacy is the export of doctors abroad.  
The Cuban government offers this medical assistance at extremely cheap prices.  During 
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the Cold War Cuba enjoyed substantial Soviet subsidies and provided much of its 
medical assistance for free.  For example, in 1963 thirty doctors were sent to Algeria on 
the first Cuban medical mission free of charge.  These doctors were critical to providing 
health care and establishing an Algerian health care system (Feinsilver, p. 157).  
However, Cuba did charge some of the more wealthy countries that it assisted.  In the 
post-Cold War period Cuba continues to offer medical assistance and does it for free or at 
bargain prices (see Table 2).  This makes it very difficult for a country to pass up.  “[I]t 
would be irresponsible of a government not to take advantage of the offer [of medical 
assistance]” (Feinsilver, p. 185).   
 
    Salary/yr               Total Earnings 
Category   (U.S. $)         Number        (U.S. $) 
General practitioner  5,760    91     524,160 
Group leader   6,840      1         6,840 
Medical specialist  6,552  294  1,926,288 
Dentists   5,760    15       86,400 
Nurses    5,160  167     861,720 
Middle level technicians  5,160  155     799,800 
Support personnel  4,380      6       26,280 
Totals       729  4,231,488 
 
Table 2.   Cuban Medical Staff (Civilian) in Angola by Category and Salary, 1982. 
(Feinsilver, p. 186) 
 
Costs are so low and quality so high that even first world countries consider 
paying for Cuban medical assistance.  An editorial in a British newspaper pointed out the 
deficiencies in the British health system and that Cuba sent medical assistance teams to 
countries that needed them.  It finished by joking, “I wonder if we [Britain] would 
qualify?” (Global News Wire, 04 Nov 2000).  Social science academics even suggest that 
if relations normalize between the United States and Cuba that, “it would not be 
inconceivable for Cuba to provide reimbursable medical care just as some European 
countries do for others” (Feinsilver, p. 209). 
The second component of medical diplomacy is the import of patients for 
advanced care in its hospitals.  This is usually a component of Cuba’s medical 
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cooperation agreements with nearby states.  Transportation by air makes this an 
expensive (thus limiting the number of patients treated) and highly visible (thus good for 
public relations) component of medical diplomacy.  Cuban also employs “medical 
tourism” as a way to generate hard currency by cashing in on the vast pool of material 
and human health resources it possesses.  The health tourism industry draws foreigners, 
principally from Latin America, for operations that would cost many times more in the 
United States (French).  In 1998 Cuba took in 5000 foreign patients and earned nearly 
$30 million for its services (Hussnain). 
Medical fees in Cuba are much less than in the United States.  Table 3 offers a 
price comparison between the two countries.  Although the information is dated from 
1988, it is valuable to see the drastic price differences.  Prices reflect all fees including 
tests and evaluation, x-rays, anesthesia, operation, hospital stay (including recuperation), 
and physician fees. 
 
Cuban Health Services price list  
Open-heart surgery, $8,897 
Neural transplant to treat Parkinson’s 
disease, $14,974 
Pacemaker installation, $4,613 
University of Michigan price list 
Hospital stay alone (without any physician 
fees), $2000/day 
Coronary bypass, $21,000 
Heart transplant, $50-100,000 
 
Table 3.   1988 Cuba-United States Medical Procedures’ Price Comparison. (Feinsilver, 
pp. 213-214) 
 
The third aspect of Cuban medical diplomacy is the offering of scholarships to its 
Latin American School of Medicine, located in Cuba on the site of an old naval academy.  
With beautiful views of the Caribbean Sea it houses and educates 5000 students from 24 
Latin American and African countries.  The six-year educational program begins with 
two-and-a-half-years of basic science and pre-med academic work.  This is followed by 
three-and-a-half-years of formal medical education at one of the island’s various 
hospitals (Gonzalez).  Non-Spanish speaking students first receive one year of language 
training making the complete program seven years. 
The fourth component of Cuban medical diplomacy is biotechnology assistance.  
Heavy investment in the biotechnology industry has made it an appealing export for hard 
currency and a powerful diplomatic tool.  Cuba possesses world-class biotechnology 
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medical research facilities and continues to make scientific advances.  “Its well-
publicized medical research earned it [Cuba] over $100 million abroad in 1998” 
(Hussnain).   
Biotechnology is the industry that sets Cuba apart from the rest of Latin America.  
It is the industry that offers the greatest appeal to potential world trading partners.   
Cuba’s export basket, which consists mainly of ag-based products, tends 
to be very similar to that of Latin American nations and, for that reason, 
holds a very limited appeal to those trading partners.  An exception might 
be Cuban biotech products, which have considerable export potential to 
the region (Perez-Lopez).   
Cuba manufactures some life-saving drugs such as a Hepatitis B vaccine and the 
cutting edge technology products interferon and recombinant streptokinase (Tehran 
IRNA, 16 Jan 2002).  However, it has yet to be able to produce the plethora of common 
medicines, such as aspirin, that its own population needs. 
Despite its earning potential, Cuba chooses to use its biotechnology power more 
as a political than economic tool.  It adds biotechnology to its medical diplomacy toolkit 
and offers to aid countries in producing life-saving drugs.  This technology transfer 
means patent infringement for powerful First World multi-national corporations.  Fidel 
Castro stated in March 2001, “We [Cuba] will fully support Brazil and South Africa, 
encouraging them to ignore U.S. patents and produce drugs to save millions of lives that 
can be saved” (Global News Wire, 23 Nov 2000).  This shows how biotechnology gives 
Cuba a valuable diplomatic tool that enables it to engage in trade discussions with even 
the largest economy in South America – Brazil. 
Cuba’s biotechnology enables the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) member states 
to ignore medical patents and gain access to cheaper drugs.  At the 2001 World Health 
Assembly NAM expressed its belief that nations should not be hindered by patents in 
obtaining the medicine and drugs they need.  “Countries should not be hindered in their 
efforts to exercise the options available to them to access life-saving and essential 
medicines” (Global News Wire, 11 Mar 2001).  The NAM acknowledges the important 
part that patents play in offering incentive to produce new drugs.  However, NAM states 
that patents must not prohibit states from getting the drugs they need.  “International 
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agreements required that these rights [patents] be exercised in a way that contribute to the 
transfer of technology and promoted social and economic welfare” (Global News Wire, 
11 Mar 2001).  To paraphrase NAM: patents are O.K. as long as they don’t prevent us 
from getting cheap drugs.  Cuba facilitates this access to advanced drugs at a low cost to 
recipient states. 
Finally, the fifth component of Cuban medical diplomacy is the professional 
exchange of doctors and public health administrators.  These exchanges stimulate 
medical cooperation between Cuba and the partnered state through the sharing of ideas 
and concepts on health.  These include methods of treating patients for certain illnesses to 
the management and operation of an individual hospital or entire public health care 
system.  While beneficial on a strictly professional level, Cuba’s influence is limited to 
only the professionals involved.     
C. MEDICAL DIPLOMACY AND WALT’S THEORY ON AID AND 
PENETRATION 
Stephen Walt, a political scientist and expert on alliances, argues that aid is 
largely ineffective as a tool for creating alliances.  Walt explains alignment choices from 
a Realist perspective that makes him skeptical of foreign aid.  In this approach, economic 
carrots have less influence than basic security needs.  He believes that without other 
motivating political factors, like a shared ideology or the emergence of a shared external 
threat, alliances will not be formed.  In his book The Origins of Alliances he argues, 
“both aid and penetration play subordinate roles in determining how states choose their 
allies” (Walt, p. 218).  He defines aid as material donations or subsidies aimed at gaining 
influence and penetration as any action designed to alter people’s perceptions in order to 
promote alignment.  He structures his theory to address aid and penetration as distinct 
and separate concepts.  For each he lists the “rare circumstances” under which they can 
be effective and the “reasons why these circumstances rarely exist.”   
Medical diplomacy can potentially satisfy all of Walt’s rare circumstances and 
overcome all of his reasons why they rarely exist.  Cuba’s general logic of medical 
diplomacy is not quid pro quo or an attempt to make the other side dependant.  This 
enables medical diplomacy to bypass many of Walt’s reasons why aid is rarely effective.  
Havana uses medical diplomacy in an attempt to change feelings towards (hearts) and 
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images of (minds) Cuba.  This section will address medical diplomacy’s aid aspects first 
and penetration aspects second.  The methodology for each will be to first discuss Walt’s 
general argument.  Second, each of Walt’s circumstances and reasons why they rarely 
exist will be individually critiqued for its applicability to medical diplomacy.  Finally, an 
overall conclusion will show that Walt’s theory predicts that medical diplomacy can be 
an effective form of aid and penetration. 
1.  Medical Diplomacy and Walt’s Theory on Aid 
a. Walt’s General Argument on Aid: Only Effective Under Rare 
Circumstances in Gaining Allies   
Walt’s theory challenges the idea that countries choose their allies based 
on material bribes (economic or military aid) and that these bribes enable the donor to 
wield influence over the actions of the recipient (Walt, p. 218).  In the debate on whether 
aid makes alliances or alliances bring aid, Walt sides with the latter.  He argues that 
donors usually provide aid to countries that are already friendly and are reluctant to 
provide aid to countries believed to be “irredeemably hostile” (Walt, p. 221).  In addition, 
it is when the two countries have a common threat or ideological affinities that the level 
of aid increases (Walt, p. 223).  Conversely, even generous levels of aid have failed to 
produce alliances when important political differences exist (Walt, p. 224).  Walt believes 
that only under very rare circumstances can aid be effective in providing a donor with 
high degree of leverage over a recipient.  “This study strongly suggests that aid has 
brought patrons significant leverage only under rare conditions” (Walt, p. 225).   
b. Applying Walt’s Theory on Medical Diplomacy: Rare 
Circumstances and Reasons Critiqued 
Walt’s belief that aid is generally ineffective in gaining allies may be true 
for many types of aid, but not for medical diplomacy.  Cuban medical diplomacy is a 
unique and special form of aid and it satisfies all of the “rare” circumstances required by 
Walt to make aid effective.  In the following discussions, Walt’s rare conditions (Walt, 
pp .236-7) are in bold italics followed by comments on Cuban medical diplomacy.     
· They (donor) have a monopoly on the type of aid being sought.  Cuba 
has a virtual monopoly on numerous, cheap, high quality doctors who will 
work in remote and desolate rural regions for long periods of time (1-2 
years).  In addition, Cuba may create a “package deal” to include import 
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of patients, medical scholarships, biotechnology assistance, and 
professional exchanges. 
· They (donor) enjoy an asymmetry of motivation regarding the issues 
involved.  When dealing with most developing countries, and even poor 
sectors of developed countries, Cuba enjoys an asymmetry of motivation.  
This means that Cuba cares less about maintaining good relations than 
does the recipient state.  In most developing states, the government values 
the health of its population much more than Cuba values political relations 
and trade with it.  And of course the poor marginalized masses of these 
countries especially value their own health.  The small price the recipient 
nation pays for Cuban medical aid motivates the recipient government to 
continue the arrangement.  The immediate cost of medical aid is free or 
cheap.  The future cost of medical aid is political support and normal trade 
relations.  Politically Cuba requests support in the UN against the charges 
of human rights violations and the U.S. embargo.   
· They (donor) face no domestic obstacles to manipulating the level of aid 
for political purposes.  Cuba is a communist country with a centralized 
government structure.  It does not face any serious domestic obstacles to 
manipulating the level of aid for political purposes.  It does face external 
obstacles to providing certain types of aid: the United States will not grant 
any aid to Third World countries that are military allies of Cuba.  Cuba got 
around this problem by ceasing military aid and focusing on non-military 
aid instead. 
Cuban medical diplomacy sidesteps or confronts all of the reasons why 
Walt says these circumstances rarely exist (Walt, pp. 237-41). 
· Alternate sources of aid are usually available.  Alternate sources of 
numerous, cheap, high quality doctors who will work in remote and 
desolate rural regions for long time periods are difficult to come by.  
Charitable organizations do provide some assistance, but few can match 
the overall aid package of doctors, patient hospital care, medical 
scholarships, and biotechnology assistance. 
· Dependence is rarely a one-way street.  Just as aid is valuable to a 
recipient, so is possessing client states important to a donor.  Cuba 
employs a strategy of counterdependency by engaging with as many 
different states as possible in order to reduce its dependency on any one 
state.  This strategy has been successful at making dependency a one-way 
street with countries in need of medical assistance.  Once the poor masses 
get accustomed to good Cuban medical care and politicians get used to 
handing out free medical scholarships they don’t want to give it up.  This 
makes a single recipient usually much more dependent on Cuban medical 
aid than Cuba is dependent on their political support or trade.  Although 
Cuban doctors and scholarships are numerous, they are of a finite quantity.  
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It is in the interest of the recipient to stay on good terms with Cuba if they 
want to keep or increase their portion of Cuban aid.   
· Providing aid can be self-defeating because it strengthens the recipient’s 
position and thus reduces its need to follow the patron’s advice.  Cuba 
goes completely against Walt’s logic that providing aid can be self-
defeating in that it strengthens the position of the recipient and thus 
reduces the donor’s influence.  Cuban medical diplomacy includes policies 
that almost guarantee the recipient will eventually no longer need 
assistance.  They receive training for their own medical students and 
technical assistance to develop their own biotechnology industry.  Cuba 
uses these policies as an example of goodwill and proof of altruistic 
motives.  Goodwill is even created when Cuba charges or barters with oil 
rich states for medical services because the price is still cheap.  Assisting 
in the development of Third World countries serves to increase Cuba’s 
number of political allies and trading partners through the generation of 
goodwill.  These allies help Cuba balance against the United States.  In the 
absence of the Cold War, Cuban “advice” to have normal political and 
economic relations is not difficult for the recipient to take. 
· Because recipients of foreign aid are almost always weaker than their 
patrons, they are likely to bargain harder when disputes arise.  In 
addition, donors have very little influence over issues that are the 
“national interests” of a recipient.  In the post-Cold War era Cuba has 
relatively little interest in influencing the domestic policies of recipient 
countries.  Cuba’s main foreign policy objectives are to protect its socialist 
government and to gain resources to perpetuate its social welfare 
infrastructure.  It seeks to accomplish these objectives by gaining political 
allies and trading partners.  These objectives are cheap to the recipient in 
comparison to the medical aid they can receive.  Therefore, there is little 
opportunity for disputes to arise and hard bargaining to occur.  If hard 
bargaining did occur, Cuba could just shift its aid to one of its many other 
recipients. 
· The decentralized nature of the foreign policy process makes aid an 
extremely difficult tool to use for political purposes.  Cuba, unlike the 
United States, does not have a decentralized foreign policy process.  Its 
centralized foreign policy process makes aid a very effective tool to use 
for political purposes.     
· Aid is most likely to provide leverage over those countries that don’t 
really matter very much.  These countries’ weakness, vulnerability, and 
isolation make them of little political use.  It is in Cuba’s interest to aid 
Third World countries.  The government hopes that through aiding these 
countries in development they will gain political allies and trading 
partners.  Eventually Cuba hopes to lead these developing states in 
collective bargaining against the developed nations of the world.  These 
countries’ weakness, vulnerability, and isolation may have made them of 
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little political use to superpowers during the Cold War, but in the post-
Cold War they are all potentially of use to Cuba.     
c. Walt’s Theory On What Aid Is Good For – Also True for 
Medical Diplomacy 
Although Walt believes that aid rarely results in significant political 
leverage, he does believe that aid can be useful to a donor.  Aid is very effective in two 
ways: aid is capable of strengthening an ally and aid (especially military aid) is an 
effective way to convey friendly intentions (Walt, p. 225).  Walt believes these two uses 
are very practical to policy makers in most all situations.  Cuban medical diplomacy 
possesses these two practical benefits that Walt attributes to aid.  It would be effective in 
strengthening an existing ally and it is an effective way to convey friendly intentions.   
2. Medical Diplomacy and Walt’s Theory on Penetration 
a. Walt’s General Argument on Penetration: Ineffective Cause of 
Alignment 
Walt’s believes that penetration is an ineffective cause of alignment.  He 
defines the concept of penetration as “the manipulation of the target state’s domestic 
political system to promote alignment.  By altering mass political attitudes or the 
perceptions of the national elite, a deliberate campaign of penetration may create a basis 
for alignment even when other motives are lacking” (Walt, p. 242).  Penetration includes 
educational, cultural, and military assistance and exchanges. 
For Walt the effects of penetration are exaggerated and often result in a 
hostile backfire against the influencer.  The risk of a hostile backfire is lowest with a 
country that is favorably aligned for other reasons, hence seriously diminishing the need 
for penetration in the first place (Walt, p. 242).   
In short, penetration is not an especially common or powerful cause of 
alignment.  It may reinforce commitments that are made for other reasons, 
but it rarely leads to such commitments in the absence of other motives 
(Walt, pp. 260-1).   
Walt believes that only when four circumstances are satisfied will 
penetration be a significant cause of alignment.  It is rare for these circumstances to be 
satisfied and therefore he believes that penetration will rarely be effective.   
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There are serious obstacles to each of these conditions, and the probability 
that all will be satisfied in any given case is low, unless such an alignment 
is viewed as desirable in its own right (Walt, p. 250).   
b. Applying Walt’s Theory on Medical Diplomacy: Rare 
Circumstances and Reasons Critiqued 
Cuban medical diplomacy is a unique and special form of humanitarian 
penetration.  Unlike education, culture, and sports cooperation, which Cuba also uses, it 
satisfies all of the circumstances required by Walt to make penetration effective.  In 
addition to being one of Walt’s “rare” cases, Cuban medical diplomacy addresses all of 
the reasons why Walt says these circumstances rarely exist.  In contrast, educational, 
cultural, and sports cooperation are limited to niche sectors of society and so cannot 
produce enough interaction to be effective.   
Penetration by Cuban medical diplomacy is accomplished in several ways: 
Most effective are Cuban doctors serving abroad because they interact on a personal level 
with thousands of common citizens.  The next most effective is foreign medical students 
studying on scholarship in Cuba.  Positive influence on these students may extend to their 
families, friends, and future patients.  Also as doctors these students will most likely be in 
the upper class and could influence their peer group.  The third most effective is the 
import of foreign patients to Cuba for care.  Transportation costs limit the number of 
patients.  Those that are treated will most probably be very positively influenced by their 
care.  Least effective are biotechnology assistance and professional exchanges.  The 
numbers of individuals involved are low and their appreciation not as high as someone 
receiving care.   
Cuban medical diplomacy fulfills all four “rare circumstances” that Walt 
states must be satisfied in order for penetration to be a significant cause of alignment.  
Walt’s rare circumstances (Walt, pp. 243-4) are listed below followed by comments on 
Cuban medical diplomacy: 
· Substantial contacts can be established between two states that are not 
already allied.  Cuba can establish substantial contacts with a foreign 
population if the recipient state accepts Cuban doctors and medical 
scholarships.  Over the course of a doctor’s stay (1-2 years) he or she can 
personally interact with literally thousands of patients.  Medical 
scholarships and hospital care in Cuba also generate favorable 
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impressions.  Other forms of technical or military penetration cannot come 
near medical diplomacy’s potential level of positive and personal contact 
with the population.  Technical and military exchanges only affect niche 
sectors of the population.  The key to establishing substantial contacts is 
the recipient state’s openness to Cuban medical diplomacy.  The 
inherently good nature of medical diplomacy makes it more palatable to 
non-allied states than other forms of aid.  Openness from the government 
of a non-allied state to medical diplomacy increases in times of 
emergency.  Poor factions within a non-allied state with poor medical care 
may always be open to medical diplomacy.  Aid to such poor factions will 
also depend on the ability of the government to block medical diplomacy. 
· The exchanges create a favorable impression on a significant number of 
relevant elites.  Cuban doctors are well trained and professional and create 
a most favorable impression not only on a significant number of relevant 
elites, but more importantly - on a significant portion of the population in 
general.  This pro-Cuba domestic political support base in turn can directly 
influence elites in a democratic country and to a lesser extent elites in a 
non-democratic country.  
· These elites gain and hold power.  Democracy means that the elites who 
gain and hold power receive the most votes from the people.  If the people 
are grateful to Cuban doctors and medical diplomacy then they may 
influence elites for good relations with Cuba through their votes.  Popular 
support also influences elites in non-democratic states, though not as much 
as in democratic ones. 
· They continue to view close alignment with the foreign power in 
question as being in their national or personal interest.  Cuba offers a 
wide range of valuable medical assistance options.  This influences elites 
to view close alignment with Cuba as being in their national (improve 
health of their people) and personal (to get re-elected or stay in power) 
interests. 
Medical diplomacy successfully addresses all of Walt’s reasons why 
penetration will rarely succeed (Walt, pp. 244-9): 
· The number of people involved in exchanges is quite small.  While Walt 
is correct that the number of people involved in exchanges is usually quite 
small (education, cultural, sports, military), this is not true for medical 
diplomacy.  The export of Cuban doctors alone can result in positive 
personal interaction with thousands of people.  Medical diplomacy 
demonstrates the concept of “forward presence” that is also so important 
to U.S. military strategic thinking.  Average citizens for the most part do 
not know who are donor countries, the amount donated, or the 
infrastructure projects made possible by these funds.  They do know what 
they see and whom they interact with personally.  Medical diplomacy 
embraces this concept of personal interaction with the citizens of foreign 
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countries.  Just as American allies physically see U.S. warships in their 
ports, so Cuban beneficiaries physically see Cuban doctors healing them.  
It is more than just sending money; it is sending people. 
· Exchange programs generally fail to alter political views.  Walt is correct 
that exchange programs generally fail to alter political views.  Because 
this is not the main objective for Cuba, it is not a problem.  Cuba’s 
objective is not to convert the recipient’s government to socialism; it is to 
gain political sympathy and support against U.S. Cuban policy and pave 
the way for future trading relations.  It is also an attempt to gain support in 
favor of Cuba’s human rights record. 
· Evidence shows that attempts to alter political views often results in a 
hostile backfire.  Since Cuban doctors just give medical care and not 
ideology lessons, this is not a problem for Cuba.  In general it is very 
difficult for Cuban medical diplomacy to create a hostile backlash that 
could overpower its positive aspects.  The hostile backlash from domestic 
medical labor unions or the embarrassment caused by the occasional 
defection of a Cuban doctor is minute compared to the overwhelmingly 
positive effect of Cuban medical diplomacy on the average citizen.  In 
addition, Cuba professes to give aid in the name of solidarity or friendship 
and does not manipulate the situation to directly teach its ideology.  It is 
difficult to generate a hostile backlash from such perceived intentions.  
Cuba claims that trade relations are just a natural byproduct of solidarity.   
· Extensive personal contacts and exchanges have proven to be a product 
of, not a cause of, alignment.  Medical diplomacy has the potential to be a 
cause of alignment because of its ability to positively influence thousands. 
· There is little evidence to show that the leaders of any state are easy to 
manipulate.  While direct manipulation of any state’s leaders may be 
impossible, indirect manipulation of elites is possible by influencing the 
voting population.  It is also difficult to call the provision of medical care 
manipulation, especially when all that is asked for is friendship and 
eventual normal trade.  The goal is to change attitudes, not to manipulate 
incentives. 
c. Walt’s Theory on What Penetration Is Good For – Also True for 
Medical Diplomacy 
Although Walt believes that penetration rarely is an independent cause of 
alignment, he does believe that it can be useful.  “By creating a network of supporters and 
a climate of favorable perceptions, informal contacts can make established alliances more 
durable” (Walt, p. 250).  Walt believes that existing alliances can be effectively 
strengthened using penetration.  Cuban medical diplomacy possesses Walt’s practical 
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aspect of penetration.  Cuban penetration using medical dip lomacy should succeed in 
making established alliances more durable.     
3. Overall Conclusion on Expectations for Medical Diplomacy Given 
Walt’s Theory 
Effective employment of medical diplomacy can make it “punch above its 
weight” to further foreign policy goals.  Medical diplomacy is superior to humanitarian 
cooperation in education, sports, or culture.  While these areas are relatively positive, 
medical diplomacy can provide the invaluable gift of health to thousands of foreign 
people.  This in turn can pave the way for improved political and economic relations with 
Cuba.   
Each component of medical diplomacy will be effective in its own unique way.  
The export of doctors and medical school scholarships are especially critical to the 
effective employment of medical diplomacy.  The export of doctors immediately and 
directly influences thousands through the patients that they individually treat.  Awarding 
medical school scholarships directly influences future members of the upper class and 
indirectly influences the thousands of patients they will eventually treat.  In this way 
Cuba can use medical diplomacy to punch above its weight by using a few people to 
influence thousands.  Importing patients for treatment in Cuba may be of value as a high 
visibility public relations tool, but can only directly influence a small number of patients 
due to high transportation costs.  Biotechnology assistance will be attractive to 
governments wishing to improve their domestic pharmaceutical production capability and 
professional exchanges are a common and uncontroversial means of sharing health 
information.  Both will have a limited impact on influencing the recipient’s population 
due to the low level of personal interaction.   
Despite the high potential for medical diplomacy to gain political allies and 
trading partners, there is a high degree of variance from country to country.  Individual 
case studies in Chapter IV will make possible conditional generalizations on the 
effectiveness of this special form of humanitarian aid. 
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IV. DETERMINING EFFECTIVENESS: CUBAN MEDICAL 
DIPLOMACY IN PRACTICE 
Determining the effectiveness of Cuban medical diplomacy requires both a 
theoretical analysis and real world examples.  Analysis of medical diplomacy using 
Walt’s theory provides an idea of under what conditions it can be effective.  Case studies 
of Mexico, Iran, South Africa, Venezuela, the United States, and Honduras demonstrate 
varying results of Cuban medical diplomacy in practice.  Careful examination of Walt’s 
abstract theory combined with these real world case studies lays a foundation to form 
conditional generalizations regarding medical diplomacy. 
The first section of this chapter introduces the case studies and revisits Walt’s 
expectations about the effectiveness of medical diplomacy in general.  The second 
section consists of individual country case studies, which evaluate the effectiveness of 
Cuba’s use of medical diplomacy in the Post-Cold War.  Finally, conditional 
generalizations will be formed based on a comparison of Walt’s expectations and the 
actual results of Cuban medical diplomacy.  
A. CASE STUDIES INTRODUCTION AND WALT’S EXPECTATIONS 
REVISITED 
Cuba has sought to improve relations with many countries through a broad array 
of political, economic, and humanitarian engagements.  These engagements seek to 
achieve the foreign policy strategic goals of: (1) protecting the Cuban government from 
the United States, and (2) gaining resources through expanded trade to perpetuate the 
socialist economy.  Cuba has employed a consistent strategy of humanitarian engagement 
with other countries to promote diplomatic and economic relations.  This strategy 
consists of establishing “cooperative agreements” in the fields of medicine, culture, 
education, and sports with as many countries as possible.  Medical diplomacy is the field 
with the greatest potential effectiveness as a foreign policy tool.  However, the effects of 
this strategy have varied with each country in terms of improved diplomatic relations and 
increased levels of trade.    
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This chapter examines a variety of case studies to examine the causes behind the 
differing outcomes of Cuba’s strategy of medical diplomacy.  Each case study is similar 
in Cuba’s attempt to engage across many areas.  Countries to be examined include 
Mexico, Iran, South Africa, Venezuela, the United States, and Honduras.  These states 
were selected in order to analyze a wide array of outcomes from Cuba’s strategy.   
The method of analysis will be to establish a baseline of relations between Cuba 
and the case study country at the end of the Cold War, describe the use of Cuban 
humanitarian aid, specifically medical diplomacy, and then identify any changes in 
diplomatic or economic relations.  The goal is to assess the effect of medical diplomacy 
in improving diplomatic and economic relations.  This method of analysis will enable the 
identification of specific conditions that favor or prevent the effectiveness of medical 
diplomacy.  Walt’s theory leads us to believe that medical diplomacy can be effective if 
the recipient is in need and open to receiving aid.  The case studies support this 
hypothesis.  In addition, Walt’s theory suggests that the order of effectiveness of the five 
components of medical diplomacy (listed from most to least effective) is: export of 
doctors, medical school scholarships, import of patients, biotechnology assistance, and 
finally professional exchanges (see Figure 1).  The case studies also support this 
hypothesis.   
Export of Import of Medical Biotech Profess
Rare circumstances under which aid is effective in creating donor leverage: doctors Patients Schlrshps assist exchange
Monopoly on the type of aid  +  +  +  +  -
Asymmetry of motivation ? ? ? ? ?
Able to manipulate level of aid  +  +  +  +  +
Penetration will be a significant cause of alignment only if:
Estab substant contacts (& not already allied)  +  +  -  - 
Exchanges make favorable impression sig # of elites  +  -  +  +  -
These elites gain and hold power. ? ? ? ? ?
Elites view close align in national/personal interest  +  +  -
OVERALL  +  +  -  
Figure 1.   The Five Areas of Medical Diplomacy Assessed by Walt's Theory. 
 
Each case study is unique and shows different effects of medical diplomacy.  
Listed in ascending order according to medical diplomacy’s effectiveness they are: 
Mexico, Iran, South Africa, Venezuela, the United States, and Honduras.  Cuban medical 
diplomacy was the least effective with Mexico.  Mexico’s public health system is not in 
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need of, nor open to, Cuban medical aid.  As a result, Cuban medical diplomacy has been 
limited to mainly professional exchanges.  These exchanges have had negligible effect on 
reducing political tensions caused by the ideological differences of President Vicente Fox 
and Castro.  Instead, Mexican business interests are the main pacifying force.  The next 
four cases are examples, to varying degrees, of aid cementing already existing alliances – 
a finding consistent with Walt’s views on aid.  In Iran, humanitarian engagement only 
served to enhance an already close political relationship with Cuba but failed to produce 
any significant trade agreements.  Iran-Cuba cooperation agreements are many but 
shallow.  It took the terrible economic conditions of the Cuban Special Period to act as 
the catalyst for increased trade.  The medical diplomacy component of biotechnology 
assistance was used, not as a political tool, but simply as an economic commodity to 
barter for Iranian oil.  In South Africa, Cuban medical diplomacy was well received by an 
ideologically sympathetic government in power coping with extreme health deficiencies.  
Engagement created the potential for future trade agreements with Cuba and most 
importantly solidified South African political support for Cuba within the UN Human 
Rights Commission.  Venezuela is a similar case in which an ideologically sympathetic 
government  (that of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez) led the way for improved 
relations with Cuba.  Cuban medical diplomacy served to legitimate a favorable 
Venezuelan cooperative agreement that gained Cuba much needed oil.  Cuba also enjoys 
Venezuelan political support within the UN Human Rights Commission.  Resulting 
cooperative agreements enabled Cuba to transform symbolic capital (socialist 
humanitarian aid) into economic capital (oil).  In the United States, Cuban medical 
diplomacy was effective at strengthening Cuba’s relationship to a friendly faction within 
the Congress and symbolically attacking U.S. policy towards Cuba.  Castro allocated 
hundreds of medical scholarships to the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) for their 
poor minority constituents.  The result is the continuation of CBC lobbying efforts for 
pro-Cuban legislation.   
Finally, the last case study challenges Walt by demonstrating medical 
diplomacy’s effectiveness in gaining new allies.  In Honduras, Cuban doctors helped with 
the country’s recovery from the natural disaster of Hurricane Mitch.  These doctors 
generated strong domestic political support from the people they assisted, which helped 
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overcome opposition to Cuban-Honduran cooperative agreements.  This led to the re-
establishment of full diplomatic relations with Cuba that had been severed in 1961. 
B. COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
1. Mexico and Cuba 
Medical diplomacy was unable to prevent the deterioration of Cuba’s political 
alliance with Mexico.  Cuba has enjoyed a long history of political support from Mexico.  
Mexican businesses have traded with Cuba, despite U.S. pressure not to, and have 
invested heavily in island nation.  On the other hand, Cuba’s medical diplomacy to 
Mexico has been relatively weak, consisting only of professional exchanges.  This weak 
form of medical diplomacy failed to offset the deterioration of the Mexico-Cuba political 
alliance under the Vicente Fox Administration.  While trade relations between the two 
countries remain good, Fox and Castro’s ideological differences have put a serious strain 
on political relations.    
Mexico and Cuba’s political alliance began with their common revolutionary 
roots and desire to demonstrate autonomy from the United States.  Mexico allowed Fidel 
Castro to train his revolutionary guerrilla forces in Mexico.  After Castro led a successful 
revolution, Mexico quickly recognized his new government.  Mexico continued relations 
with Cuba even when pressured by the United States to break relations.  Mexico followed 
a foreign policy of having relations with all governments regardless of their internal 
politics.  This policy acted as a shield against foreign intervention into Mexico’s own 
politics and demonstrated autonomy from the United States.   
Mexico has been an important trading partner for Cuba.  Mexican businesses 
traded with Cuba throughout the Cold War despite U.S. attempts at isolating the island.  
In the post-Cold War era Mexican businesses invested heavily in Cuba as it liberalized its 
foreign investment laws.  Commenting on U.S. pressure to end trade with Cuba, Mexican 
Ambassador to Havana Claude Heller stated his country would, “Act in keeping with its 
foreign policy principles, ignoring the laws aimed at restricting the natural trade among 
sovereign nations” (Havana Radio, 29 May 1997).   
Cuba’s medical diplomacy efforts failed to create political influence in Mexico.  
Mexico’s adequate health system prohibited Cuba from enjoying what Walt describes as 
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an asymmetry of motivation.  While Mexico was open to a two-way technical exchange 
of medical knowledge, it was far from desperate for Cuban doctors or medical 
scholarships.  This resulted in medical cooperation accords that only focused on the least 
influential component of medical diplomacy, professional exchanges.  This is reflected in 
the comments of Mexican doctors like neurosurgeon Marco Zenteno,  
We need to learn many things from Cuba regarding neuro-epidemiology, 
reference and counter reference of patients…On the other hand we have 
other high technology advances.  I believe it is a 50-50 cooperation 
(Havana Tele, 09 Sep 1997). 
Professional exchanges’ positive influence is restricted to the niche occupations 
involved. 
Cuba’s political alliance with Mexico began to deteriorate with the election of 
Vicente Fox to President on July 3, 2000.  Fox’s radically altered Mexican foreign policy 
to emphasize free trade and regional cooperation in human rights and the treatment of 
migrants (Mandel-Campbell).  These beliefs are in direct opposition to Castro’s anti-
globalization ideology and socialist view of human rights.  The Cuban President believes 
that free trade serves only to make the developed nations more wealthy and that Cuba is a 
human rights model for its universal health care and education systems. 
Tensions arose when President Fox visited Cuba in February 2002 and chose to 
meet with Cuban dissidents at the Mexican embassy in Havana.  Later Mexico’s 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs Jorge Castaneda made an announcement that Mexico would 
“cease relations with the revolution and initiate relations with the Cuban republic,” which 
he noted, “predates the revolution” (O’Grady).  Other comments by Castaneda prompted 
Radio Marti to broadcast into Cuba that the Mexican embassy was accepting dissidents.  
This prompted a group of Cubans to steal a bus and run it through the embassy gates in 
an attempt to secure asylum (O’Grady).  When Uruguay sponsored a resolution in the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission to condemn Cuba’s human rights record 
Castro tried to blackmail Fox into voting against it using a taped phone conversation 
between them.  Fox failed to comply and Cuba lashed out by making the tape public 
(O’Grady).  In the tape Fox asked Castro to “leave me free” on the last day of the 
Monterrey Conference “so you don’t complicate my Friday” – a day Fox wanted to 
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devote to President Bush (Weiner).  The Monterrey Conference was a UN sponsored 
meeting on development held in Monterrey, Mexico.  This taped conversation was an 
embarrassment because it made Fox appear to slight Castro in favor of catering to Bush.  
Mexico voted in favor of the UN Human Rights Commission resolution to 
condemn Cuba for human rights violations and to send a UN human rights inspector to 
Cuba on 19 April 2002.  This dramatically altered the history of Mexico’s political 
support for Cuba in the UN Human Rights Commission (see Figure 2).  Mexico’s 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs Jorge Castaneda explained to Newsweek the reasons behind 
the policy change: (1) the wording of the resolution was much more positive, moderate, 
encouraging to Cuba; (2) the resolution was drafted and cosponsored by Latin American 
countries; and (3) President Fox’s foreign policy centers on much greater activism in the 
multilateral arena and in the regional arena (Newsweek).    
 
Year Resolution Yes-No-Ab Mex Iran S.Afr Vnzla US Hndr
1997 PASS 19-10-24 ABSTAIN OPPOSE IN FAVOR
1998 FAIL 16-19-18 ABSTAIN OPPOSE ABSTAIN IN FAVOR
1999 PASS 21-20-12 OPPOSE OPPOSE OPPOSE IN FAVOR
2000 PASS 21-18-14 ABSTAIN OPPOSE IN FAVOR
2001 PASS 22-20-10 ABSTAIN OPPOSE OPPOSE IN FAVOR
2002 PASS 23-21-9 IN FAVOR OPPOSE OPPOSE
Note 1: Blank entries represent that the country did not hold a seat on the Commission for that year.
Note 2: Special Rapporteur appointed in 1992 at the request of the United States.  Cuba refuses to cooperate citing U.S. political motives. 
Note 3: 1997 is the first year the Commission votes on a resolution to censor Cuba for human rights violations.
Figure 2.   UN Human Rights Commission:  Voting Record for Resolution Censoring 
Cuba for Human Rights Violations.  (From:  Website for “Reports on U.N. Human 
Rights Bodies” United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) 
http://www.hri.ca/uninfo/hrbodies/unchr.shtml. 
 
Although Mexico-Cuba relations are strained politically, economic relations 
continue to grow.  Even under the tension Castaneda stated that his nation had no plans to 
cut diplomatic relations or recall its ambassador (Kraul).  An expanded economic 
agreement, visits to Cuba by Mexican businessman, a renegotiated payment plan for 
Cuba’s $380 million Mexican debt, and Cuba’s tourism potential for Mexican businesses 
all show that relations with Mexico continue to be good despite Castro’s argument with 
Fox.  In May 2002 authorities from the Mexican Economy Secretariat and the Cuban 
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Foreign Trade Ministry signed the expansion of the Complementary Economic 
Agreement, whereby they will obtain preferential tariffs ranging from 30 to 50 percent 
less in tax payments.  In June 2002, 140 Mexican businessmen visited Cuba to strengthen 
trade relations in sectors such as food, footwear, farming and livestock (Mexico City El 
Universal).  Orlando Romero Merida, Havana’s trade adviser, emphasized the potent ial 
of Cuba’s tourism industry to Mexican businesses and commented on the tension 
between Castro and Fox and its effect on relations: “One hundred years of diplomatic 
relations cannot be broken off in one week nor in one month; they constitute permanent 
ties of brotherhood.  The relationship will continue as an important factor between our 
peoples” (Mexico City El Universal). 
Cuban medical diplomacy had virtually no impact on Mexico and Cuba’s political 
relations.  While professional exchanges may positively influence the few individuals 
involved, it is not an effective tactic at creating widespread political support.  The 
divergent ideologies of Fox and Castro seriously strained political relations.  Castro’s 
attempt to blackmail Fox is only offset by Mexican business interests in Cuba.  Mexican 
business interests are a pacifying force to the political strife between the two leaders.    
2. Iran and Cuba 
Cuban medical diplomacy and humanitarian cooperation alone were not enough 
to improve economic relations with Iran.  It took Cuban desperation for oil, caused by its 
economic crisis of the early 1990s called the “Special Period,” to produce any signs of 
substantial economic cooperation.  These economic cooperation agreements had little to 
do with Cuba’s political alliance with Iran or its humanitarian engagement efforts.  
Political solidarity caused by a united stance against the United States was not enough to 
expand trade and Cuban biotechnology assistance to Iran became an economic 
commodity to trade rather than a form of medical diplomacy.   
The most powerful reason for Iran and Cuba’s strong political relations is their 
united stance against their common enemy, the United States.  Cuba’s relations with Iran 
began soon after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran as a symbol of solidarity with a 
fellow revolutionary government (BBC, 06 Jan 1981).  Since that time, the United States 
has levied trade sanctions, made accusations of human rights abuses, and named both 
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Iran and Cuba as state sponsors of terrorism.  Iranian and Cuban leaders have seen it to 
their advantage to work together against “colonialism and dictatorship” (Tehran IRNA, 
02 Jul 2001) in order to “confront the domination of arrogant powers [Tehran’s 
propaganda nickname for Washington, in order to] defend their independence” (AP 
Worldstream).  During his official visit to Iran in 2001, Fidel Castro told university 
students that, “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its 
knees. The U.S. regime is very weak, and we are witnessing the weakness from close up” 
(Hughes).   
The primary means of cooperation between Cuba and Iran has been political 
support through international organizations like the Group of 77 (G77), Nonaligned 
Movement, and the United Nations (Tehran IRNA, 08 Oct 2000a; 18 Jul 2001).  The G77 
is the largest political organization of developing countries with 133 member states and 
four-fifths of the world’s population.  Its goal is to craft a common view of international 
issues in order to collectively bargain with the developed world (Tehran IRNA, 18 Jul 
2001).  Iran and Cuba both support each other in fending off accusations of human rights 
abuses (Tehran IRNA, 08 May 2001).  Government officials on both sides take every 
opportunity to hail the other side’s cooperation in international bodies, particularly with 
the UN Human Rights Commission (Tehran IRNA, 03 May 1999). 
Calls by Iranian and Cuban officials to increase trade during the Cold War were 
mainly rhetorical.  Almost every year Iranian and Cuban leaders would express their 
satisfaction with Iran-Cuba political solidarity and call for increased cooperation in other 
fields.  Cooperation never materialized with the one exception of agricultural 
cooperation.  Iran solicited and received agricultural technical assistance from Cuba in 
1987 due to its desire to become agriculturally independent (BBC, 09 Jun 1987).   
The end of the Cold War and of Soviet subsidies kicked Cuba into motion to 
expand its economic ties.  The loss of low-priced Soviet oil plunged Cuba into an energy 
crisis in the early 1990s during which electricity was rationed to all but priority economic 
sectors such as the foreign-exchange-earning tourism and biotechnology industries (Cuba 
Facts.com.  Cuban officials repeatedly declared that Cuba was in a state of emergency 
and in need of increased trade, especially oil.  In September 1990, Fidel Castro sent the 
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Minister of Sugar Cane to Iran with a hand written note for the Iranian president urging 
maximum dynamism to expansion of economic ties alongs ide the good political relations 
already existing between the two countries (BBC, 10 Sept 1990).  Over the next few 
years Cuba’s desperate situation produced substantial economic cooperation agreements 
with Iran.  In 1990, Cuba agreed to assist Iran with its sugar production (BBC, 18 Sept 
1990).  In 1991, Havana signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Tehran (Newsday).  
And in 1993, Cuba agreed to assist Iran with its biotechnology industry and also 
dispatched a small medical staff to Iran (BBC, 27 Apr 1993). 
Biotechnology has been the linchpin to Cuba’s trade relationship with Iran.  Iran 
characterizes its overall view of medical cooperation with Cuba as a means to achieve 
greater independence from the developed world (Tehran IRNA, 08 Feb 1998).  The 
single largest effort has been Cuba’s assistance in setting up vaccine production units in 
Iran.  This joint biotechnology project involved a combined 60 million dollar investment.  
It is located on a 250,000 square meter plot of land 25 kilometers from Tehran near the 
city of Karaj.  It was expected to be completed by early 2002 but has experienced delays 
due to the U.S. embargo against both countries.  The facility is planned to produce four 
pharmaceutical products including hepatitis B vaccines.  The production capacity will be 
far above Iran's demand for the products enabling it to export (Tehran IRNA, 09 May 
2001).   
Fidel Castro is personally involved with the promotion of Cuban biotechnology to 
Iran.  In May Castro met personally in Iran with the execut ives of a joint Iran-Cuba 
biotechnology project for the production of pharmaceutical drugs.  He told them that 
Iran-Cuba biotechnology cooperation was a “high priority” in the two countries 
cooperation and that it could produce “fruitful results” (Tehran IRNA, 09 May 2001).  
Biotechnology continues to dominate relations between Iran and Cuba in 2002.  
During the eighth session of the Cuba-Iran Intergovernmental Commission the Iranian 
Ministry of Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation (MINVEC) stated that one of 
the most important topics is that of biotechnology products.  Iranian officials hoped that 
in a short period of time their country would be able to produce the Hepatitis B vaccine 
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and the cutting edge technology products interferon and recombinant streptokinase.  
(Tehran IRNA, 16 Jan 2002).   
Cuba and Iran’s cooperation in other areas continues to be superficial.  Each year 
they sign a barrage of cooperation agreements in such fields as tourism, hotels, culture, 
sports, education, agricultural, industry, parliament, and banking (TASS; Xinhua; BBC, 
25 Nov 1997; Tehran Voice; Tehran IRNA, 20 Oct 1998; Tehran IRNA, 11 Jul 1999; 
Tehran INRA, 27 May 2000; Tehran IRNA, 16 Jan 2002).  Regardless of these 
agreements, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) states that reported trade between the 
two countries was less than $10 million for all years from 1994-99 (Central Intelligence 
Agency).  This does not agree with verbal statements from Cuban and Iranian officials or 
other newspaper stories that stated trade was a meager $20M in 1994 (Agence France 
Presse, 24 Dec 1994) and less than $30M in 1997 (BBC, 06 Feb 1992).  Whatever trade 
that did occur between Iran and Cuba was not reported by either country. 
Cuba main goal throughout the Special Period was to improve its domestic oil 
production and get Iranian oil.  In 1990 Cuba received Iranian technical assistance to 
remove problems from its sole oil refinery (BBC, 18 Sept 1990).  It is uncertain how 
much, and at what price, Iran provided Cuba with oil.  Iranian officials made statements 
alluding to several oil agreements in the mid-1990s but no official figures were reported 
(BBC, 27 Apr 1993; Agence France Presse, 19 Feb 1995).  Several experts in the United 
States believe that Cuba traded nuclear and biological weapon secrets in exchange for oil.  
Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy magazine reported that the “September 1991 
deal between Iran and Cuba included the exchange of nuclear delivery techniques and 
technology for oil” (Bodansky).  Edward Gonzalez, a consultant for the Rand 
Corporation stated,  
Cuba has good trade relations with Iran and Iraq and given these ties it's a 
definite possibility that (Cuban President) Fidel Castro will attempt to get 
a high return on his biotechnology investments...It’s likely that Cuba has 
the potential if not the actual capacity to create biological 
weapons…Those investments will yield a much higher return if they 
produce biological weapons for terrorists or rogue nations than if they’re 
used to produce medicine for Third World countries (Trull).   
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Cuba and Iran deny any nuclear or biological weapons research (Mardini) and 
Former President Jimmy Carter visited Cuba and stated to the press that U.S. officials had 
told him that there was no evidence linking Cuba to the export of biological weaponry 
(Ingraham).  Regardless of intent, Cuba most probably gained desperately needed oil in 
exchange for nuclear and biotechnology assistance. 
Although Cuban medical diplomacy can be credited with strengthening political 
relations with Iran, it was not effective in promoting trade.  Iran and Cuba continue to 
support each other politically against the United States and accusations of human rights 
abuses.  The economic hardships of the Cuban Special Period spurred Cuba to expand its 
economic ties.  Havana used the biotechnology component of its medical diplomacy 
capability as an economic commodity to buy Iranian oil.   
3. South Africa and Cuba 
The regime transition in South Africa from a white dominated to an inclusive 
government that va lued social transformation created fertile ground for Cuban 
humanitarian engagement, specifically medical diplomacy.  Apartheid formally ended 
with the 1994 parliamentary elections, in which black South Africans were included 
among the enfranchised (Schwartzman).  This new government began to slowly 
transform South African society.  A chief means of this is to improve the horrible 
condition of medical care in the rural areas.  In 1996 the South African Health Minister 
welcomed the first group of Cuban doctors to his country, “We are now struggling for the 
transformation of society so that we can provide basic needs to our people. Cuba is very 
much part of that struggle” (Lee).  Cuba has used medical diplomacy to strengthen an ally 
in order to solidify political support and hopes to benefit from possible future trade 
agreements.     
South Africa has many public health deficiencies that Cuba has been able to 
alleviate using its medical power through medical diplomacy.  The two main problems 
that the South African Health Ministry faces are a shortage of doctors (especially in the 
rural areas) and a lack of medicines (especially AIDS medicines).  Rural provinces like 
the Eastern Cape Province have a doctor to population ratio of 1:10,000.  The World 
Health Organization (WHO) recommends a minimum ratio of 1:1,000 (Global News 
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Wire, 07 Feb 2001).  In 1996 there were about 2000 vacant doctor positions in rural areas 
(Lee).  Affordable medicines and basic vaccines are in extremely short supply.  AIDS 
retroviral drugs are very expensive and so make their use in treating the large infected 
population prohibitive.  Cuba’s supply of quality doctors, medial scholarship program, 
and expertise in biotechnology are well-suited solutions to South Africa’s public health 
problems.  
The general distaste of South African doctors for working in the rural provinces 
made Cuban medical assistance very attractive.  Young medical school graduates, who 
must all perform some community service, scramble for jobs in the city of Cape Town.  
Of the young doctors who do perform their service in the rural communities, few stay.  
Provincial health officials cite the lack of senior mentors, inadequate medical facilities, 
and poor living conditions (Global News Wire, 13 March 2001).   
South Africa has found Cuban doctors a good solution to this immediate problem.  
According to Dr. Bevan Goqwana, head of public health in the Eastern Cape Province, 
“Many South African doctors, especially young graduates, are unwilling to work in rural 
areas.  Most of the doctors who work in these areas are foreign doctors, the majority 
being Cuban and Asian doctors” (Global News, Wire 07 Feb 2001).  Cuban doctors in 
South Africa received praise from Cuban and South African health officials alike.  South 
African Health Minister Manto Tshablala-Msimang made statements that “Cuban doctors 
have provided outstanding service in the rural areas”(Global News, Wire 27 March 2001) 
and “There has been improvement in the quality of treatment in almost every hospital 
where we have deployed Cuban doctors” (Global News Wire, 30 Mar 2001b).   
The outstanding performance of Cuban doctors in South Africa was more than 
sufficient to initiate a more lasting medical cooperation agreement between the two 
countries.  In March 2001 an agreement between the South African and Cuban Health 
Ministries was signed covering all of the critical South African public health problems.  
These include the recruitment of doctors, the training of medical students, an exchange 
training program for medical researchers and specialists, and an improved exchange of 
medical technology (Global News Wire, 30 Mar 2001b). 
47 
The South Africa-Cuba medical agreement was signed despite domestic 
opposition groups in South Africa.  The Rural Doctor’s Association of South Africa 
opposed the government’s use of foreign doctors.  Chairman Ian Cooper stated the 
government needed to “stop paying lip service” to keeping South African doctors in the 
country.  His organization advocated laws restricting the use of foreign doctors and 
expanded programs for domestic physicians.  These programs include better financial 
incentives, specialist training, and bringing back doctors who had emigrated from the 
country.  The Association admitted that the Cuban doctors had helped but that they 
lacked generalist skills like anesthesia and were limited by their different culture and 
language (Global News Wire, 13 Mar 2001). 
South Africa embraced Cuba’s offer of medical scholarships as a good short-term 
solution to their shortage of rural doctors.  A Health Ministry official stated, “Sending 
students to Cuba is not an end in itself, but is a short-term means to addressing 
imbalances in these areas”(Global News Wire, 07 Feb 2001).  Students are selected from 
rural areas for a seven-year scholarship to Cuba’s Latin America School of Medicine.  In 
return they agree to seven years of government service in rural clinics.  The program 
began in 1997 with 61 students.  Health Minister Manto Tshablala-Msimang addressed 
the students, “You are going with a challenge, a mission, and you must fulfill 
it…Without this opportunity you would never have the opportunity to study medicine” 
(Global News Wire, 06 Sept 2000).  In March 2001 the Health Ministry argued with the 
Health Profession Council that just as exiled doctors are not required to take medical 
exams to register in the country, so medical students in Cuba who have been 
disadvantaged by apartheid should not be required to take the exams as well (Global 
News Wire, 30 March 2001b).    
Cuba’s expertise in biotechnology was able to help address South Africa’s 
shortage of medicines.  The South African Health Minister described his country’s 
biotechnology goal as, “To ensure an adequate and reliable supply of safe, cost-effective 
drugs of acceptable quality to all South Africans and for all the diseases that continue to 
pose major health challenges to our country” (Global News Wire, 30 Mar 2001a).  This 
can be interpreted to mean that the importance of patent rights is secondary to that of the 
health of the population.  In March 2001 Castro offered to assist South Africa in 
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producing generic drugs of their own.  The Health Minister replied, “We are going to 
examine this.  It is very interesting to us” (Global News Wire, 27 Mar 2001).  This offer 
was followed by a visit to Cuba by South African President Thabo Mbeki.  During this 
visit he made an agreement with Castro to cooperate on the production of AIDS drugs 
and ignore patents (Global News Wire, 30 March 2001a).  Subsequently South Africa’s 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act was challenged by multi-
national-corporations in the country’s Pretoria High Court for eroding patent rights 
(Global News Wire, 30 Mar 2001a).    
Cuba has benefited from its use of medical diplomacy to South Africa with 
increased trade and especially political support.  Although absolute levels of trade are 
low, Cuban exports and imports to South Africa have increased from 1996 (the beginning 
of Cuban medical diplomacy) until 1999: exports rose from 0 to $2 million and imports 
rose from $17 to $23 million (Central Intelligence Agency).  Political support has been 
through South Africa’s vote on the United Nations Human Rights Commission.  It has 
held a seat on the Commission five out the last six years (1997-2002).  Every year South 
Africa has voted against the resolution to censor Cuba for human rights violations (see 
Figure 2).   
Internal changes within the South African government made it ideologically 
friendly with Cuba.  The country sought societal transformation and chose to solicit 
assistance from Cuba in attaining this goal.  Cuba used its medical power to assist its new 
ally with its terrible rural medical conditions.  Cuban doctors, medical scholarships, and 
biotechnology expertise have proven to be more influential with the South African 
government than the hostile backlash from the domestic Rural Doctor’s Association of 
South Africa, Health Profession Council, or pharmaceutical multinational corporations.  
Cuban medical diplomacy led to increased trade and most importantly, political support 
in the UN Human Rights Commission.    
4. Venezuela and Cuba 
The December 1998 election of Hugo Chavez to the Presidency of Venezuela led 
the way for improved relations with Cuba.  The new president’s socialist ideology opened 
the door to alliance with socialist Cuba.  In this case Cuban humanitarian engagement 
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was more of an effect of good relations than a cause.  Medical diplomacy, however, 
served an important purpose of legitimizing the new economic cooperation arrangements 
between the two countries.  Cuba was not getting oil for free or solely because of the 
ideology of Chavez, it received oil as part of a “cooperative agreement” for medical 
services.  
Cuba offered medical assistance after Venezuela was struck by natural disasters in 
early 2000.  A team of over 400 medical personnel was dispatched to provide aid to flood 
victims.  In February 2000 three doctors applied for political asylum (Global News Wire, 
16 Feb 2000).  This resulted in 63 doctors to be promptly returned to Cuba (Global News, 
Wire, 17 Feb 2000).  Months later Fidel Castro blamed the Cuban American National 
Foundation (CANF) for the defections (Global News Wire, 23 Nov 2000).   
The Venezuelan Medical Federation (FMV) protested the presence of the Cuban 
medical team.  The FMV claimed that the Cuban doctors had not been certified to 
practice medicine in Venezuela and were unsafe (Global News Wire, 26 Nov 2000).  The 
FMV also opposed any talk of future medical cooperation agreements between Cuba and 
Venezuela.  FMV President Jesus Mendez claimed that the Cuban doctor presence 
threatened to keep 8,000 medical school graduates unemployed and placed the “the 
health of Venezuelans in the hands of others without any type of scientific or union 
control” (Global News Wire, 23 Nov 2000).  The government continued to negotiate an 
agreement, stating that Venezuelan doctors just won’t go to remote places and work in 
adverse conditions as Cubans do.  President Chavez characterized Venezuelan doctors as 
“merchants of medicine” (Global News Wire, 30 Nov 2000). 
Cuban medical diplomacy was used to add a sense of legitimacy to discounted 
purchases of Venezuelan oil.  In October 2000 President Castro and President Chavez 
signed the Integral Cooperation Accord (AIC) in Caracas.  The agreement entitles Cuba 
to 53,000 barrels per day of crude oil on “easy terms,” which include payment via the 
provision of medical services or technical services in the agricultural and sports areas 
(Global News Wire, 26 Nov 2000).  In March 2001 the mayor of Caracas traveled to 
Havana and signed a report outlining the fundamental points of another bilateral 
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cooperation agreement on health, education, sports, culture, and infrastructure (Global 
News Wire, 11 Mar 2001).  Chavez signed the agreement later the same month. 
In addition to favorable oil sales, Cuba enjoys political support from Venezuela.  
Venezuela has held a seat on the United Nations Human Rights Commission every year 
from 1998-2002.  In 1998 Venezuela abstained from the annual resolution to censor Cuba 
on human rights violations.  After President Chavez’s election in December 1998, 
Venezuela voted against the annual resolution every year to date (see Figure 2).  This is 
due mostly to the political alliance between Chavez and Castro that is based on a 
common socialist ideology.   
Treating Venezuelan patients in Cuba is an important part of the AIC.  In addition 
to its humanitarian nature, flying patients to Cuba was also highly political.  President 
Chavez saw off the first group of 50 patients personally and commented that, “The idea is 
that every two weeks the presidential plane will leave for Havana with Venezuelan 
patients” (Global News Wire, 26 Nov 2000).  High-ranking state officials greet patients 
at the Jose Marti Airport upon their arrival in Cuba (Global News Wire, 29 Apr 2001).  
The patients have been mostly children with severe bone injuries, heart problems, or 
vision problems.  All expenses are paid by the Cuban government for their 35-day 
hospital stay in Havana (Global News Wire, 30 Nov 2000).  This high-profile means of 
healing Venezuelan children is extremely advantageous to creating a favorable image of 
political leaders in Cuba and Venezuela. 
Technology transfer was another important aspect of the cooperation agreements.  
Cuba agreed to help Venezuela construct their own specialized cardiology center.  
Doctors were flown to Havana in April 2001 to begin specialist training and review 
construction documents (Global News Wire, 29 Apr 2001).  This act lends legitimacy to 
the AIC.  It shows that Cuba is contributing something of value to Venezuela for the oil it 
receives. 
Cuban medical diplomacy enabled economic and political cooperation with 
Venezuela to appear legitimate and was unaffected by the hostile backlash from the 
Venezuelan Medical Federation.  In reality the strong ideological ties between Chavez 
and Cuba were the driving force behind cooperation.  In September 2000 on Cuban TV 
51 
Castro told Venezuelan journalists, “We support the Bolivarian ideals because they are 
based on the need for unity of the people and on such ideals as those of Bolivar and 
Marti” (Global News Wire, 10 Sept 2000).  Later, in March 2001, Chavez meet with 
Castro to review the possibility of forming “a triangle” between Santo Domingo, Havana, 
and Caracas (Global News Wire, 11 Mar 2001).  Havana effectively uses medical 
diplomacy to legitimate its ideological bonds with Venezuela. 
5. The United States and Cuba 
Cuba’s uses its long time success in racial equality and its medical power to 
defend itself, symbolically attack the United States, and to influence American politics.  
Cuba defends itself from U.S. accusations of human rights violations by pointing to its 
human rights triumphs of health, education, and racial equality.  Cuba symbolically 
attacks the United States by accusing it of being racist and a public health failure that 
violates the “human right of health.”  Cuba influences American politics by aiding the 
long-time allied Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) through medical scholarships for 
their poor constituents.  The  CBC in turn supports normalizing relations with the island 
nation.    
Cuba’s socialist values and unique history make it a model of equitable race 
relations for the CBC and many African Americans.  On the eve of Cuba’s fight for 
independence against Spain, plantation owners freed their slaves and then asked them to 
join in the revolutionary effort.  This marks the beginning of the Cuban identity – that of 
whites and blacks fighting together for independence.  Castro’s revolution has actively 
emphasized the  contributions of Africans and provided all citizens with free health care 
and education regardless of race.  The socialist values of equality for all people have 
made African Americans very favorable to the Cuban cause.  When Castro came to 
power, he told  his people that the blood of Africa flows through the veins of every Cuban 
and every Cuban is at least a mulatto.  “If we study history,” he said, “we'll find that 
Spain was conquered by the Moors.  So we have an interest in Africa and African 
liberation” (Aidi). 
Cuba is able to use it success in health care to symbolically attack the United 
States because of the different value systems that the two countries are built on.  Cuba 
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values the equitable distribution of material goods.  Prized among these goods are 
education and health care.  The United States values the equitable distribution of 
economic opportunity.  People have the opportunity to succeed economically and the 
opportunity to choose to spend their money on health care.  Each citizen is guaranteed a 
low level (relative to Cuba’s average) of health care through minimal government social 
services.  Julie Feinsilver cites that,  
Even if there is room for improvement in Cuba’s medical sector, it still 
compares very well with American practice, which only now is being 
recognized for what it is: a monument to inefficiency, insufficiency, and 
discrimination (Feinsilver, pp. xii-xiii).   
What Feinsilver leaves out is that American medicine is among the best in the 
world – you just have to pay for it. 
The Congressional Black Caucus and many African Americans have been long 
time supporters and sympathizers of the Castro government.  This has been due to the 
advancement of Cuban blacks through education, medical care, and an eclectic culture 
that praises the accomplishments of Africans.  Organizations that actively support Cuba 
include the private Washington D.C. policy group TransAfrica Forum.  It lobbies 
Congress on African issues such as sanctions against South Africa and intervention in 
Haiti.  Members include artists and intellectuals like the actor Danny Glover (Petit).  The 
36-member CBC has long supported lifting trade sanctions against Cuba, has visited 
Cuba, and extended an invitation to Cuban officials and Castro to its meetings (Shepard).  
In addition, the CBC has long been aggravated by the “double-policy” for immigrants 
from Cuba versus Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and elsewhere.  “They wouldn't think 
about it if it were 20 black kids from Haiti,” said Rep. Charles B. Rangel (D-N.Y.), a 
sharp critic of U.S. policies toward Cuba, as he commented on the Elian Gonzalez case 
(Pianin).  All 40 members of the CBC were in favor of the United States returning Elian 
Gonzalez to his father in Cuba and the Chairman of the CBC gave personal attention to 
the boy’s grandmothers when they visited the United States. Castro was appreciative of 
this stating,  
We are aware the Congressional Black Caucus has shown great interest in 
Elian's case.  His grandmothers said they were impressed with the 
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attention they were given by the CBC during their visit to the United 
States…We wish to have more contacts with the Congressional Black 
Caucus on other issues (Shepard). 
Castro has masterfully used medical diplomacy to court support from the CBC.  
The idea to grant medical scholarships to minority Americans came up during a June 
2000 U.S. Congressional Black Caucus visit to Havana.  Rep. Bennie Thompson, D-
Miss., said parts of his Mississippi Delta district had so few medical personnel that its 
infant mortality rate was the second worst in the United States, behind Washington, D.C.  
Castro suggested medical scholarships for 10 to 12 Americans similar to what Cuba 
offers Third World countries (Shepard).  The Cuban leader commented, “It would be 
hard for your government to oppose such a program.  It would be a trial for them.  
Morally, how could they refuse?” (Shepard). 
A year later Castro capitalized on the concept of giving medical scholarships to 
minority Americans.  In the fall of 2001 Castro attended the CBC’s annual legislative 
conference in Washington D.C. and gave a six-hour speech at Harlem’s Riverside 
Church.  During the speech he offered 500 seven-year medical scholarships with the 
selection program administered by the CBC.  CBC members embraced this opportunity.  
“This appears to be an excellent opportunity to improve health care in our Congressional 
districts, as well as a chance to fulfill a life’s dream for students who couldn’t otherwise 
afford it,” said Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY) (Aidi).  Half of these scholarships were 
designated for African Americans and the rest were divided between Hispanics and 
Native Americans.  To qualify, students had to be economically disadvantaged and 
willing to return home after graduation and practice medicine for at least five years in 
their impoverished communities (Wickham).  
Granting medical scholarships to Americans enables Cuban officials to make 
symbolic attacks against the United States.  These attacks are then supported by 
statements from American students.  Dagoberto Rodriguez, the Director of North 
American Affairs in the Cuban Foreign Ministry, stated that, “The objective Cuba has is 
to help resolve the serious problems of health in the United States” (Gonzalez).  
American students like Eric Khalil Marshall from the Bronx supports this by questioning 
the U.S. system, “I’m from the so-called richest country in the world.  Why don’t we 
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have health care for everybody, things that people who have less than us, like in Cuba, 
have?” (Gonzalez).  Anti-Castro hard- liners in the U.S. claim that Cuba is using the 
students for political gain.  Students like Mirtha Arzu from the Bronx reply, “I’d rather be 
used for something positive than negative…at least I’m going to go back and show my 
community what I was used for” (Gonzalez).  
It is an extremely tough task to describe the Cuban medical scholarship program 
as political manipulation and evil.  The school’s rector Dr. Juan Carizo Estevez stated in 
a New York Times interview,  
This is a medical school with the qualities that we have.  What it does 
have is a human goal.  We teach with love and humanity and tell the 
students we work with every day that their hearts will grow more and 
more when they return to their communities to work.  It is a less 
commercial view of medicine, where they see the patient as a patient, and 
not as a number on a budget.  If that is politics, then everything should be 
as political.  It’s human (Gonzalez).   
U.S. accusations of Cuban human rights violations lose their edge given 
statements like this.  
The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and Congressmen from 
Cuban American districts have downplayed the scholarships and have attempted to 
dissuade the CBC.  A spokesperson for U.S. Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Baralt (R-FL) called the 
offer a “propaganda ploy” from a nation that is hoping to have the embargo lifted (Aidi).  
CANF sent black Cuban exiles to meet with CBC officials to convince them that Cuba is 
racist.  The exiles reported that blacks were over represented in the island’s political 
prisons and underrepresented in powerful positions in the government and Communist 
Party.  They pleaded for the CBC to intercede on behalf of oppressed black Cubans.  “We 
know there are many members of Congress who can talk to Castro so that he will free 
political prisoners,” said Magdelivia Hidalgo, who is not black but who worked with 
several black dissidents on the island before she was forced to leave (Lorente).  Despite 
this counter- lobbying from the Cuban American community, the CBC has not changed its 
position on Cuba. 
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Cuba’s use of medical diplomacy to the United States is influential in improving 
political relations.  Since the end of the Cold War, Castro has effectively strengthened his 
existing ally in the U.S. Congress, the Congressional Black Caucus, using medical 
diplomacy.  This had been accomplished by giving the CBC hundreds of Cuban medical 
scholarships that it may award to minorities.  The CBC in turn has lobbied to normalize 
relations and drop U.S. sanctions against Cuba.  Cuban medical diplomacy will most 
likely continue to solidify and strengthen the CBC’s resolve to support Cuban issues in 
the U.S. Congress 
6. Honduras and Cuba 
Cuba’s strategy of medical diplomacy was decisively effective in Honduras.  
Honduras had no diplomatic or economic relations with Cuba during the Cold War 
(Hernandez) and had not reestablished relations in the years following the end of the Cold 
War.  Despite this standoff condition, Cuba volunteered critical medical aid in 1998 after 
a brutal hurricane struck Honduras.  This aid came in the form of medical personnel who 
were dispatched to treat the Honduran common people in the most devastated areas.  In 
less than a year these health workers won the hearts and minds of the Honduran people 
who in turn pressured their government to sign a medical cooperation agreement and 
normalize relations with Cuba.   
Hurricane “Mitch” devastated Honduras in 1998.  It was the deadliest storm in the 
last 200 years and succeeded in killing 6,400 people and destroying 80% of the country’s 
infrastructure.  Mosquito dengue, malaria, cholera, and skin disease became rampant 
(Global News Wire, 01 Dec 1998).  The river Choluteca broke its banks near the capital 
of Tegucigalpa resulting in tens of thousands homeless, mud everywhere, and soldiers 
deployed to keep order (Davison). 
As the international community pledged monetary donations and forgave 
Honduran debt, Cuba offered to send doctors.  This was despite the fact that Honduras 
had broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961 (Associated Press) and had not 
reestablished relations in the years following the end of the Cold War.  Tegucigalpa 
accepted the offer and 140 Cuban medical personnel arrived to assist in the most 
devastated areas (Global News Wire, 04 Nov 2000).  Risking their own health, the 
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Cubans operated out of emergency clinics with no electricity and only buckets to wash 
their hands in.  Hundreds of Hondurans suffering from fungus and respiratory diseases 
waited in line for medical treatment (Davison).  Dr. Juan Rodriguez Meso, team leader, 
replied to questions on his team’s presence in the disaster area, “It’s a question of 
solidarity…these people are our brothers” (Davison).  From November 1998 to 
September 1999 Cuban health personnel conducted 500,000 medical visits, 250,000 
nursing visits, 5,000 major surgical operations, and 3,300 minor surgical operations 
(Global News Wire, 24 Sept 1999). 
The Cuban medical team’s effect on the Honduran people was remarkable.  The 
scene of the first group’s departure illustrates how they had won the hearts and minds of 
the Hondurans.   
Women with children in their arms, peasants, students, and social activists 
traveled from different parts of Honduras to the airport of San Pedro Sula, 
in the northern part of the country, for an emotional farewell for the Cuban 
doctors, whom they hugged and with whom they cried (Global News 
Wire, 30 Sept 1999).  
Cuba obviously had a much greater grassroots political effect than those countries 
that just wrote a check.  Cuba’s medical diplomacy had created a powerful pro-Cuba 
political base within the Honduran population, as subsequent events would demonstrate.      
The success of the Cuban medical team opened the door for more cooperation 
between the two countries.  In October 1999 Cuba and Honduras signed a medical 
cooperation agreement that included 500 Cuban doctors to serve in Honduras and 
graduate training for Honduran health professionals (Global News Wire, 24 Sept 1999).  
The Honduran Medical Association opposed the agreement.  Their protests were 
outmatched by the combined cries of numerous communities that pressured the 
government to sign the agreement (Global News Wire, 15 Jan 2000). 
Cuban medical diplomacy to Honduras also included medical scholarships to the 
Latin American School of Medicine.  In 1999, 280 Honduran students arrived to study 
and 150 students followed them the next year (Global News Wire, 25 Feb 2000).  These 
students will most likely return to their impoverished communities with a very pro-Cuba 
viewpoint to share. 
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Cuban medical diplomacy paved the way for formal diplomatic relations to be re-
established with Honduras.  
In his last major act in office, President Carlos Flores Facusse has re-
established diplomatic relations with Cuba after a 41-year hiatus…many 
Hondurans felt gratitude for Cuba’s shipment of scores of doctors to the 
most remote areas of the country after Hurricane Mitch hit in 1998 
(Associated Press).   
Cuba effectively used medical diplomacy to befriend Honduras and normalize 
relations.  
Cuba used humanitarian aid to reverse 41 years of poor relations with Honduras.  
One hundred and forty medical personnel won the hearts and minds of the Honduran 
people in just ten months.  This in turn resulted in the swift normalization of political 
relations and trade despite a hostile backlash from the Honduran Medical Association.  
Humanitarian aid that is given under a perception of altruism and reaches the masses of a 
democratic country can have significant effects in other spheres.   
C. CONDITIONAL GENERALIZATIONS ON MEDICAL DIPLOMACY 
1. Walt’s Theory is Largely Effective for Evaluating Medical Diplomacy 
Walt’s theory is largely effective for evaluating medical diplomacy (see Figure 3).  
Cuban medical diplomacy has the potential to be an effective form of aid because it 
satisfies two of Walt’s rare circumstances: Cuba’s authoritarian government has a 
monopoly on cheap medical aid and the political ability to manipulate levels of that aid.  
Walt’s third rare circumstance is asymmetry of motivation, which is dependent on the 
level of need of the recipient state or political group.  The devastation from Hurricane 
Mitch created a medical emergency in Honduras.  This opened a window of opportunity 
for Cuba to apply medical diplomacy to a non-allied state.  Honduras quickly accepted 
Cuba’s offer to send 140 medical personnel.  Very poor medical conditions within the 
congressional districts of CBC members also created asymmetry of motivation for Cuba.  
Castro’s offer of 500 medical school scholarships was quickly accepted despite CANF 
lobbying to the contrary.  While the main driving force behind Cuban medical diplomacy 
to South Africa and Venezuela was ideological in nature, the extremely poor health 
conditions in the rural regions of both countries did create a degree of asymmetry of 
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motivation.  In contrast, the governments of Iran and Mexico did not need Cuban doctors 
or medical scholarships.  Both countries only chose to cooperate with Cuba in the least 
influential areas of medical diplomacy: Iran negotiated a deal for biotechnology 
assistance and Mexico engaged in professional exchanges. 
Rare circumstances under which aid is effective in creating donor leverage: Honduras Ven S. Africa Iran Mexico US US CBC
Monopoly on the type of aid  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
Asymmetry of motivation  +  +  -  -  -  +
Able to manipulate level of aid  +  +  +  +  +  +  +
Penetration will be a significant cause of alignment only if:
Estab substant contacts (& not already allied)  +  -  -  -  +
Exchanges make favorable impression sig # of elites  +  -  -  +
These elites gain and hold power.  +  +  +  +  -  -  +
Elites view close align in national/personal interest  +  +  +  -  -  -  +
OVERALL  +  -  -  +  
 
Figure 3.   Country Case Studies Assessed Using Walt's Theory. 
 
Cuban medical diplomacy also has the possibility of being an effective means of 
penetration by satisfying Walt’s rare circumstances.  First, it can establish substantial 
contacts with people in non-allied states.  Cuba was the most successful in doing so with 
Honduras, which had broken off diplomatic relations with the island nation in 1961.  
After Hurricane Mitch, Cuban doctors positively influenced thousands of Hondurans by 
providing medical care.  Second, exchanges can make a favorable impression on a 
significant number of elites.  In Honduras, elites reestablished full diplomatic relations 
with Cuba after receiving aid.  Medical diplomacy also made good impressions on the 
leaders of already allied states (Venezuela, South Africa, Iran).  In the United States, 
good impressions were made on the CBC who received medical scholarships, though not 
the nation as a whole that did not receive aid.  The small degree of medical diplomacy to 
Mexico was not nearly enough to outweigh the political conflict between President Fox 
and Fidel Castro.  Third, elites influenced have remained in power or have made 
decisions before stepping down that are difficult to reverse.  One of the last acts of 
Honduran President Carlos Flores was to reestablish full diplomatic relations with Cuba.  
The goals of the leadership of other states have, to date, also remained aligned with Cuba 
(CBC, Venezuela, South Africa, Iran).  In Mexico, the leadership has remained anti-Cuba 
politically, although Mexican businesses remain heavily invested in Cuba.  Finally, 
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medical diplomacy has caused Honduran elites to view close alignment in their national 
and personal interests.  The medical cooperation agreement with Cuba is good for their 
nation’s health system and personal reelections.  In other case studies (CBC, Venezuela, 
South Africa, Iran) close alignment was due mainly to compatible ideology.  In Mexico, 
President Fox’s emphasis on free trade and human rights makes it in his interest not to be 
aligned with Cuba.   
2. Conditional Generalizations for Walt’s Theory 
Whereas Walt’s theory is largely effective for evaluating medical diplomacy, it 
has two minor shortcomings and one major deficiency.  The following conditional 
generalizations for medical diplomacy will account for these deficiencies and 
complement Walt’s theory.   
a. Minor Shortcoming: Medical Diplomacy Does Not Conform to 
the Realist Perspective 
· Medical diplomacy seeks not to alter national security objectives, but  
to use its inherent goodness to change attitudes.  
Medical diplomacy is an attempt to change a recipient’s feelings towards 
(hearts) and images of (minds) the donor.  This use of aid is different than Walt’s.  He 
advocates the Realist perspective that economic carrots will rarely override a state’s basic 
security needs.  Medical diplomacy’s, however, is inherently good and its benign nature 
can have an emotionally powerful effect on people.  This makes medical diplomacy 
potentially capable of satisfying all of Walt’s rare conditions under which aid is effective 
in establishing alliances.  This is most evident in the case study of Honduras, and to lesser 
degrees the United States, Venezuela, and South Africa. 
b. Minor Shortcoming: Backlash Not from Ideology, but from 
Domestic Labor Interests 
· Medical diplomacy’s ability to export doctors can generate a hostile 
backlash from domestic medical professional organizations that fear 
competition and a loss of regulating power. 
In every case study that included the export of doctors (Honduras, 
Venezuela, South Africa) there was a hostile backlash.  This backlash was not generated 
by a difference of political views (ideology) that Walt’s theory emphasizes.  Instead it 
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came from labor (medical professionals) that felt threatened by the introduction of cheap 
Cuban workers.    
c. Major Deficiency: Democracy’s Effect on Target Selection for 
Penetration 
· Medical diplomacy can promote alignment through penetration of the 
masses.  This is especially true in democratic states due  to the 
influence of voters on elected officials.  
Walt does not differentiate between different types of governments of 
recipient states and focuses on the impact of elite perceptions on alignment.  While this 
might be appropriate for non-democratic states, it is not altogether true for democratic 
states.  Elite perceptions are important, but the perception of the voting masses is also 
important.  Walt’s lack of attention to the power of penetrating the voting masses of a 
democracy leads him to underestimate the potential power of medical diplomacy.  
Medical diplomacy, especially the export of doctors and medical scholarships, has the 
potential to positively influence significant portions of the voting masses in a recipient 
country.  These grateful voters can then in turn influence government elites to craft a 
favorable relationship with Cuba.  This is most clearly depicted in the Honduras case 
study.  Grateful Hondurans protested the departure of Cuban doctors and efforts of the 
Honduran Medical Association to block a Honduras-Cuba medical cooperation 
agreement.  Cuban aid to the CBC is a reverse example.  Cuba directly influences the 
CBC with medical scholarships and then the CBC promotes a positive image of Cuba to 
their constituents.  The case studies of Venezuela and South Africa illustrate a positive 
impact on a segment of the voting population, yet this segment has not demonstrated a 
political voice.  This could be because there is no danger of the Cuban doctors departing, 
thus removing the reason to protest.  To a lesser degree, medical diplomacy could 
potentially also promote alignment in non-democratic states through influencing the 
masses.  Although the masses do not have a vote, it is still in the interests of the 
governing elites to garner popular support in order to consolidate their power.  
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V. CONCLUSION: APPLICATION TO THE OVERALL U.S. 
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY FOR THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 
In March [2002], the Gallup organization released the results of polling in 
nine predominantly Muslim countries.  In only two of them did the 
proportion of respondents with a “very favorable” opinion of the United 
States exceed a tenth of the population: Lebanon, where the number was 
18 percent, and Kuwait, where it was 11.  But these pro-American 
respondents were themselves offset by the 30 percent of Lebanese and 23 
percent of Kuwaitis who recorded their opinion of us as very unfavorable.  
In Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, a mere 7 percent said they held a very 
favorable view of us, with seven times that number, or 49 percent, at the 
opposite end of the spectrum; in Pakistan, Gallup had to report an asterisk 
under “very favorable,” signifying a response of less than 1 percent.  With 
the exception of Turkey, the news was hardly any better 
elsewhere…Confronted with the Gallup figures, President Bush 
exclaimed, in a masterpiece of understatement: “We’ve got work to do” 
(Muravchik). 
The United States is engaged in a global War Against Terrorism that shares many 
of the same characteristics as stability operations, also referred to as Military Operations 
Other Than War (MOOTW).  Chief among these is gaining and keeping world support in 
order to deny terrorists possible sanctuary and recruits.  In this way medical diplomacy 
can complement U.S. military strength through “winning the hearts and minds” of the 
world.  Medical diplomacy’s inherent goodness and ability to positively influence 
thousands through a few people make it an effective soft power tool.  Cuba has used 
medical diplomacy successfully on Honduras to gain an ally.  It also strengthened its 
existing alliances with the U.S. Congressional Black Caucus, Venezuela, South Africa, 
and Iran.  Its success from this unorthodox tactic lends credibility to medical diplomacy.  
This chapter reviews the findings of the thesis and considers their implications for U.S. 
foreign policy in the War Against Terrorism.  It argues that it is in the interest of the 
United States to “win the hearts and minds” of the people of the world to support its 
global War Against Terrorism.  A comprehensive U.S. medical diplomacy policy for 
Afghanistan and possibly other Muslim countries could include the export of doctors, 
medical school scholarships, basic health infrastructure improvements, import of patients, 
biotechnology assistance, and professional exchanges. 
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The first section of this chapter will summarize the preceding chapters.  The 
second section will address medical diplomacy’s applicability to the U.S. War Against 
Terrorism.  The final section will recommend specific medical diplomacy policies to gain 
support for the United States in its War Against Terrorism. 
A. CUBAN MEDICAL DIPLOMACY: AN EFFECTIVE TOOL IN GAINING 
POLITICAL SUPPORT 
Cuba is a country that is least likely to expect success with a humanitarian 
strategy.  There are several reasons fo r this: (1) Cuba has limited resources to carry out a 
humanitarian aid strategy; (2) Cuba has a negative human rights image to overcome; and 
(3) Cuba is the enemy of the world’s sole superpower, the United States.  Cuba’s success 
with a medical diplomacy strategy provides convincing evidence that medical diplomacy 
can be an effective foreign policy tool for other countries as well. 
The end of the Cold War left Cuba without a superpower ally.  It lost military 
protection and the majority of its trading partners.  Although Cuba was steadfast in its 
ideology, it was forced to change its foreign policy tactics to adapt and survive in the new 
world order.  The end of Soviet economic subsidies and military protection made it no 
longer safe to send Cuban soldiers abroad.  To continue with its strategy of military aid to 
states and revolutionary movements guaranteed Cuba’s global isolation and eventual 
collapse.  Cuba turned to political, economic, and humanitarian engagement as its tools of 
choice to promote its national interests, strengthen diplomatic relations, and increase 
trading partners.  Chief among its humanitarian engagement tactics is medical diplomacy.   
Medical diplomacy can satisfy Stephen Walt’s rare conditions under which aid 
can be effective in alliance formation.  Medical diplomacy’s inherent goodness and 
benign nature can have an emotionally powerful effect on people.  It is an attempt to 
change the recipient’s feelings towards (hearts) and images of (minds) the donor.  This is 
not to say that medical diplomacy is viewed by all as harmless.  The export of cheap 
Cuban doctors has often resulted in a hostile backlash from domestic medical labor 
organizations.  Medical diplomacy, especially the export of doctors and the awarding of 
medical scholarships, is effective at positively influencing the masses.  The masses in 
turn can pressure national elites who wish to be re-elected or maintain power.     
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The case studies validate these hypotheses and demonstrate that medical 
diplomacy can be effective in both gaining and consolidating allies.  Hurricane Mitch 
created a medical emergency in Honduras that created an asymmetry of motivation for 
Cuban medical diplomacy.  The export of doctors and awarding of medical scholarships 
produced grassroots political support for Cuba and led to the quick reestablishment of 
diplomatic relations with Honduras.  Cuban medical diplomacy to the U.S. Congressional 
Black Caucus, Venezuela, South Africa, and Iran strengthened Cuba’s existing alliances.  
In one case, medical diplomacy was not politically effective.  Minimal Cuban medical 
diplomacy to Mexico was not enough to overcome the ideological and political conflicts 
between President Vicente Fox and Fidel Castro.   
B. APPLICABILITY FOR THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM 
U.S. military strength is not enough to win the War Against Terrorism.  Public 
support in the United States and in other countries is also required in order to limit 
terrorist sanctuaries and recruits.  Military power can be augmented with medical 
diplomacy to create a more effective overall campaign plan and garner public support.  
To demonstrate the applicability of U.S. government- led medical diplomacy for the War 
Against Terrorism requires a discussion of the principles of MOOTW, the traditional role 
of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the political feasibility of such an 
approach, and potential recipient countries.  This section argues that for medical 
diplomacy to be effective it must meet the six basic principles of MOOTW and must find 
a way to coordinate its actions with NGOs working in this area.  In addition, it explores 
the political feasibility of the U.S. government adopting such an approach and the 
possible recipient states for U.S. medical diplomacy.   
For medical diplomacy’s efforts to be successful, they must meet the six 
MOOTW principles of objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and 
legitimacy (Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. II-1).  The objective is to improve health in recipient 
states and in doing so foster a positive image of the United States.  Unity of effort  can 
occur if medical diplomacy is directly coordinated into the U.S. government’s overall 
campaign plan.  This can most easily be achieved by making a government organization 
the lead in medical diplomacy.  Security, however, must be provided by other U.S. forces 
to those people engaged in medical diplomacy.  Restraint is demonstrated by medical 
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diplomacy’s mission to heal, not destroy.  Perseverance can be shown through 
commitment to a long-term effort to develop a country’s public health system.  
Legitimacy for U.S. action is created by the inherently positive influence of medical 
diplomacy.   
For medical diplomacy to be effective, the U.S. government must coordinate its 
actions with those of NGOs already providing medical aid overseas.  For the most part, 
NGOs are founded by private parties to fill the void left by perceived government 
inaction.  They traditionally provide disaster relief and state development, which are 
defined as: 
Relief is characterized by short–term, emergency service in the face of 
disaster, whether natural or man-made.  These operations include airlifting 
food, clean water, and sanitation equipment to distressed populations; 
establishing shelter for homeless victims; repairing salvageable structures; 
and preventing, containing, and treating life-threatening diseases.  
Development involves long-term projects aimed at helping communities 
build sustainable social, economic, and political structures.  The assistance 
focuses on the development of vital components of society – agriculture, 
education, infrastructure, employment, and so forth – and is deemed a 
success when continued aid becomes unnecessary because a society has 
become self-sufficient (Aall, 2000, pp. 368-9).   
Several NGOs are focused specifically on health.  The NGO Doctors Without 
Borders provides teams to recipient countries that provide primary health care, perform 
surgery, vaccinate children, rehabilitate hospitals, operate emergency nutrition and 
sanitation programs, and train local medical staff (Aall 2001, p. 132).   
The U.S. government addresses unity of effort in humanitarian operations by 
establishing a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).  This entity brings together 
U.S. military, U.S. government civilians, and a variety of autonomous NGOs.  Because 
NGOs are autonomous from the U.S. government, mediation and negotiation tactics are 
used in place of direct command and control.  Although less than efficient, this has been 
the best solution to the unity of effort problem to date.   
The U.S. military’s role in humanitarian relief and development in Afghanistan 
illustrates some of the challenges of coordinating U.S. government sponsored 
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humanitarian aid with NGOs.  U.S. Special Forces soldiers conceal their weapons 
beneath neutral khakis and polo shirts and ride around in unmarked sport utility vehicles 
as they administer a $5 million humanitarian aid effort.  NGOs and the UN have 
protested that the soldiers’ wearing of civilian clothes undermines the principle of 
neutrality that grants NGOs access to war torn regions.  In addition, most NGOs have a 
long-term agenda for development and are suspicious of the military’s goals.  The 
Geneva Conventions state that soldiers are not required to wear uniforms but are obliged 
to carry their weapons openly to distinguish themselves from civilians (Glasser).   
A possible solution to the controversy over the U.S. military performing 
humanitarian missions that retains U.S. ability to garner support could be to employ U.S. 
government civilians instead.  U.S. military Special Forces in Afghanistan include civil 
engineers, public health specialists, a hydraulics expert, a veterinarian, a dentist, and even 
two military lawyers.  In addition, the head of the CMOC (named the Coalition Joint 
Civil Military Operations Task Force) is a brigadier general (Glasser).  Why must these 
professionals be military?  Why not have civilian humanitarian special forces instead?  
The advantages would be an U.S. demonstration of civilian control of the military, 
maintaining and enhancing unity of effort over humanitarian actions, positive U.S. image 
building to the recipient population, and reduced criticism from NGOs concerning 
military wearing civilian clothing while performing humanitarian functions.  U.S. 
government civilian medical relief and a development package would be a key part of 
such a strategy.   
Adopting and implementing a medical diplomacy package will face some 
difficulties in the United States.  Personnel will have to be recruited and paid to create a 
force of government civilian medical workers to carry out U.S. medical diplomacy.  
Cuba’s authoritarian government decided to spend resources to develop and employ its 
civilian medical workers.  The decentralized U.S. government cannot make such a 
decision as easily.  This leads to the next difficulty that the United States will face, 
altering foreign policy to include medical diplomacy.  Walt has argued that one of the 
rare circumstances for aid to be effective in alliance formation is the absence of domestic 
obstacles to manipulating the level of aid for political purposes.  The U.S. foreign policy 
decision-making structure is much more decentralized than Cuba’s.  The President, 
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House of Representatives, Senate, media, lobby groups, and voter sentiment all influence 
foreign policy and can affect the manipulation of aid.  This difference does not make 
medical diplomacy less applicable for the United States.  For although Cuba’s 
authoritarian government may decide on and implement foreign policy strategies more 
easily than the United States, such ease does not lessen the effectiveness of a medical 
diplomacy strategy.  Adopting a medical diplomacy foreign policy would require that 
Americans (1) want political support from abroad for the War Against Terrorism, (2) 
understand the potential effectiveness of medical diplomacy in gaining political support, 
and (3) be willing to support the allocation of resources for medical diplomacy. 
Vocal peace activists could threaten the Bush Administration’s current emphasis 
on military action in the War Against Terrorism but the inclusion of a medical diplomacy 
component should be able to garner the support of actors across the political spectrum.  In 
Santa Cruz, California, Amy Courtney and Cassandra Brown won a suit with the 
California Transportation agency (Caltrans), which has allowed them to hang their anti-
war banners from highway overpasses.  These banners carry slogans such as “War at 
what cost?  $200 billion, 10,000 dead” or “U.S. = rogue state” (Delgado).  The response 
from motorists as they hung their anti-war banners was mixed with some honking support 
and others extending the middle finger and yelling.  Courtney commented that she wasn’t 
surprised.  “It’s kind of expected.  I know there’s people out there who support the war, 
but what people forget is that there’s a loud voice of people who don’t support the war.  
That voice has been pushed out of the media and even off of the overpasses” (Delgado).  
The Administration must stay aware of the divergent public opinions within the United 
States if it hopes to succeed in its War Against Terrorism.  An overall campaign plan that 
includes medical diplomacy and other humanitarian components would probably receive 
much more support from such peace activists, or at least neutralize the appeal of their 
message to other Americans.  
Possible recipient states for U.S. medical diplomacy are predominantly Muslim 
states where the United States may enjoy an asymmetry of motivation.  This would 
exclude wealthy states that have sufficient resources to devote to their public health 
system already.  Possible recipients could include states like Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, 
Libya, Ethiopia, Jordan, Yemen, or Pakistan.  Failed states like Afghanistan or Somalia 
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could also be potential recipients of United States medical diplomacy.  Walt stresses that 
aid can only be effective in gaining influence over states that politically “don’t really 
matter very much…[because their] weakness, vulnerability, and isolation make them of 
little political use”.  This viewpoint may have been correct during the Cold War era that 
stressed conventional and nuclear strength, but it is seriously flawed in the current 
context of the U.S. War Against Terrorism.  The economic misery and political instability 
within failed states can create a fertile breeding ground for anti-American terrorist 
sentiment.  Terrorist leaders can portray the United States as a global hegemonic power 
that cares little for the plight of people within failed states.  Evidence of U.S. medical 
diplomacy would directly contradict this type of anti-American propaganda.  It could 
gain public support for the United States and marginalize terrorists within the recipient 
state.  This public support, in turn, could support the U.S. War Against Terrorism by 
denying terrorists potential sanctuary and recruits.        
C. OPTIONS FOR MEDICAL DIPLOMACY IN THE U.S. WAR AGAINST 
TERRORISM 
An effective medical diplomacy package should aim to positively influence as 
many people as possible and foster the eventual self-sufficiency of the recipient state.  
Specific policy options are listed below in order of potential effectiveness, starting with 
the most effective.   
· Export of doctors : Small medical teams of a doctor, nurse, and technician 
sent on two-year tours to recipient states can positively influence 
thousands through the patients that they treat.   
· Medical scholarships : Scholarships for doctors, nurses, paramedics, and 
technicians serve to create the human resources necessary for public health 
care self-sufficiency.  They also positively influence the students through 
their time in the United States and interaction with Americans. 
· Basic infrastructure : Small medical clinics with refrigeration units for 
vaccines are cheap and effective ways to drastically improve public health.  
Additional projects could be focused on public sanitation (clean water and 
sewage treatment).  
· Import of patients : This is an expensive and potentially high profile 
means of treating patients with complex ailments in U.S. hospitals.  
Children should be the first recipients for both moral and public relations 
reasons.   
68 
· Biotechnology: The focus should be on selling, subsidizing, or donating 
basic vaccines and inoculations.  These products are an inexpensive way 
to drastically improve public health. 
· Professional exchanges: Medical personnel from the recipient country 
can visit the United States to receive training and instruction from their 
counterparts in areas ranging from hospital administration to surgical 
procedures.  This could create solid bonds and good relations between 
health professionals in both countries. 
Medical diplomacy could play a vital role in the U.S. War Against Terrorism by 
garnering public support in recipient countries and thereby limiting potential terrorist 
sanctuaries and recruits.  The small and state of Cuba has used medical diplomacy with 
success in Honduras to gain a new ally and towards the U.S. Congressional Black 
Caucus, Venezuela, South Africa, and Iran to strengthen existing alliances.  A U.S. 
government civilian organization tasked with implementing medical diplomacy could 
demonstrate U.S. civilian control of the military, maintain and enhance unity of 
command over humanitarian efforts, build a positive U.S. image for the recipient 
population, reduce NGO criticism concerning military wearing civilian clothing while 
performing humanitarian functions, and gain favor with most segments of the U.S. 
population. 
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APPENDIX.  CUBA’S OVERSEAS CIVILIAN PROGRAMS IN THE 
LATE 1980S 
In Africa 
Algeria. Begun in 1963. Fishing, health, agriculture, light industry, higher education, 
research and development, sports, construction.  
Angola. Construction (in 1987, down to 1,700 Cubans), education, sports, health, fishing, 
forestry, sugar industry, trade organization, poultry farming, labor organization, party 
organization. 
Benin. Begun in 1977. Health, education (over 100 students from Benin have studied in 
Cuba), sports, fishing, livestock, trade and labor organization, sugar industry. 
Burkina Faso. Begun in 1984. In September 1986, 600 students from Burkina Faso 
arrived at the Isle of Youth. 
Burundi. Health; after 1983, also agriculture, education, sugar industry.  
Cape Verde. Health, education, transportation, culture, trade organization.  
Congo. Livestock, dairy industry, poultry farming, education (900 students from the 
Congo were in Cuba on scholarships in 1983), sports (begun in 1984), agriculture, 
construction, health. 
Equatorial Guinea. Health, education (begun in 1973); later, also agriculture, forestry, 
communications, and military advice (these programs were curtailed in the late 1970s and 
resumed after the overthrow of President Macias in 1979.  
Ethiopia. Begun in 1977. Health, education, construction, veterinary medicine, 
aviculture, agriculture, labor organization, planning organization, sugar industry. 
Ghana. Begun in early 1960s, stopped in 1966, resumed in 1982. Education (secondary 
and higher education scholarships in Cuba), sports. 
Guinea. Begun in 1961. Health, agriculture, sports (stopped by end 1986), education, 
fishing, leadership training, construction (including building two airports).  
Guinea-Bissau. Communications, construction, education, sports, health. 
Libya. Health (begun in 1977; 213 Cuban medical personnel in 1983, down from 650 in 
1978), construction. 
Malagasy Republic. Sugar industry, agriculture, sports (ended by early 1987), education.  
Mali. Health, sports. 
Mozambique. Begun in 1976. By 1981, hundreds of Cubans were in 7 of its 10 
provinces. Agriculture, food industry, forestry, health, construction, education (including 
4,300 scholarships to Cuba), sports, fishing, transportation, communications, sugar 
industry, chemicals. 
Nigeria. Sugar industry, sports.  
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Sao Tome and Principe. Health, education, fishing, livestock, communications, planning, 
trade organization, transportation, agriculture, construction, sports. 
Seychelles. Begun in 1978. Health, agriculture, education.126 Tanzania. Education, 
sports, construction, health. 
Uganda. Begun in 1981. Health, education. 
Zaire. Sugar industry. 
Zambia. Begun in June 1986. Unspecified. 
Zimbabwe. Begun in March 1986. Education, health. 
 
In Asia and the Middle East  
Afghanistan. Education (begun in April 1978). 
Iraq. Construction (roads, 1,500 housing units), agriculture, sugar industry, fishing, 
sports, health (begun in 1977; 372 Cuban medical personnel in 1986, down from 506 in 
1983). 
Kampuchea. Health (Cuba supplies 4 percent of its stock of medical doctors); 
communications. 
Kuwait. Sports (probably commercial contract). 
Laos. Construction (78 Cuban workers), agriculture and livestock, health. 
Sri Lanka. Health, education. 
South Yemen. Begun in 1972. Transportation, agriculture, fishing, light industry, steel, 
health, education (590 secondary school students from South Yemen on Isle of Youth in 
1982), poultry farming, livestock, mining, sports, construction. 
Syria. Education, health (in 1973 during war with Israel). 
Vietnam. Begun in 1968. Health, agriculture, construction, fishing, sugar.  
 
In Latin America  
Bolivia. Begun in 1987. Donation of 3 intensive care units. 
Dominican Republic. In 1987, Cuba agreed to donate materials and labor to build a 
technical school worth $2.8 million. 
Guyana. Begun in 1974 with a fishing agreement (since expired); in late 1980s sugar 
industry, forestry, agriculture, health, light and food industries, mining, transportation, 
trade and labor organization.  
Nicaragua. Education (over 2,000 Cuban teachers in Nicaragua and 1,200 Nicaraguans 
on scholarships in Cuba), sports, health (over 250 Cuban medical personnel in 
Nicaragua), fishing, construction. 
Panama. Agriculture, sports, education.  
Peru. Sports. (Dominguez 1989, p. 173) 
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